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The Inescapable Federalism of the
Ninth Amendment
Kurt T. Lash*

ABSTRACT: For the past several decades, the majority of courts and
commentators have viewed the Ninth Amendment as a provision justifying
judicial enforcement of unenumerated individual rights against state and
ftderal abridgment. The most influential advocate of this libertarian
reading of the Ninth Amendment has been Professor Randy Barnett, who
has argued in a number of articles and books that the Ninth Amendment
was originally understood as guarding unenumerated natural rights.
Recently uncovered historical evidence, however, suggests that those who
framed and ratified the Ninth Amendment understood it as a guardian of
the retained right to local self-government. Recognizing the challenge this
evidence poses to libertarian theories of the Ninth Amendment, Professor
Barnett now argues that what evidence we have is consistent with both a
libertarian and federalist reading of the Ninth Amendment and that
remaininggaps in the historicalrecord preclude a solely federalist readingof
the Clause.
This Article clarifies the distinction between the federalist and libertarian
models of the Ninth Amendment and argues that the two models are
incompatible in critical ways. In addition to critiquingProfessor Barnett's
reading of the historical evidence, this Article presents newly discovered
evidence of the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment that fills in
important gaps in the historical record and strongly supports an originally
federalist understanding of the Amendment. The Article concludes by
distinguishing the Ninth Amendment from the Tenth Amendment and
considers the FourteenthAmendment's potential impact on the meaning and
scope of the Ninth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the benefits of using history as a guide to constitutional
interpretation is that it allows for ever more refined conclusions based on an
ever growing database of historical evidence. As scholars reassess and
reformulate prior conclusions, newer understandings increasingly stabilize
as the range of plausible interpretations narrows. Recently, Ninth
Amendment scholarship has witnessed this kind of aggregated evolution of
understanding as a number of works have greatly increased the stock of
historical evidence surrounding the enactment of this heretofore mysterious
Amendment.' For those interested in the original meaning of the
to refine
Constitution, this new evidence provides a significant opportunity
2
(or alter) our prior assumptions about the Ninth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticutset the stage for
the first modern debate over the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.' The
majority of Justices in Griswold accepted the Ninth Amendment as textual
support for judicial enforcement of a broad array of individual rights. 4 The

dissenting Justices claimed the Ninth Amendment simply mirrored the
Tenth Amendment as a general statement of limited federal power. 5 In the
decades that followed, the scholarly debate essentially echoed the Griswold
divide: Most legal commentators accepted the majority's libertarian reading
of the Ninth Amendment, 6 while a few dissenters attempted to link the

1.

For some of the more influential recent works on the Ninth Amendment, see

generally Randy E. Barnett, James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 1 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989);
RANDY E. BARNETTr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004);
EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1957); CALVIN R.
MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION'S UNENUMERATED
RIGHTS (1995); BENNETT B. PATFERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS UNDER SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF TODAY
(1955); Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980); Russell L. Caplan,
The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223 (1983); Knowlton H. Kelsey,
The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936); Norman Redlich, Are
There "CertainRights... Retained by the People", 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787 (1962); Eugene M. Van
Loan, III, NaturalRights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1968). I, too, have written
on the Ninth Amendment. See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2004) [hereinafter Lash, The Lost Original Meaning]; Kurt T.
Lash, The Lost Jurisprudenceof the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005) [hereinafter Lash,
The Lost Jurisprudence];Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-HistoricalTheory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 895 (2008) [hereinafter Lash, Textual-HistoricalTheory].
2.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
3.

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

4.

See id. at 484; id. at 486-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring).

5.

See id. at 529-30 (Black,J., dissenting).

6.
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 1, at 13; BARNETr, supra note 1, at 240-42; MASSEY, supra
note 1, at 213; see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 39 (1997); Mark C.
Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal
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Ninth Amendment to the state-protective declaration of the Tenth
Amendment.7 The latter passive-federalist accounts (so-called because they
see no active role for the Ninth Amendment) failed to gain significant
academic support, leaving the libertarian model as the predominant view in
legal scholarship.
The preeminent scholarly standard bearer for the libertarian reading of
the Ninth Amendment is Professor Randy Barnett. Because Professor
Barnett is both the most eloquent and influential advocate of a libertarian
reading of the Ninth Amendment, this Article focuses on his arguments in
comparing the libertarian and federalist accounts of the Amendment. Over
the past two decades, Barnett has produced a number of books and articles
advocating a libertarian reading of the Ninth Amendment on both
normative and originalist grounds." Although Barnett's work extends well
beyond the Ninth Amendment, he has consistently argued that the original
meaning of the Ninth Amendment supports judicial enforcement of
unenumerated individual natural rights. 9 As Barnett believes Ninth
Amendment principles are enforceable by courts of law, this Article refers to
his approach as an active libertarianreading of the Ninth Amendment.' l
Recently uncovered historical evidence, however, calls into question the
libertarian reading of the Ninth Amendment. In two prior articles, I
presented a substantial body of evidence indicating that the Ninth
Amendment was conceived and received as a federalist provision preserving
the people's retained right to local self-government." This is how its drafter,
James Madison, understood the Amendment, and this is how scholars and
judges construed the Amendment for more than one-hundred years after its
Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 117-23 (2000); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1150-55 (1987); Van Loan, supra note 1, at 4-24.
7.
See THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY THE FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING (2000); Caplan, supra note 1, at 228-

59. Professor Akhil Amar has suggested the Ninth Amendment protects the people's collective
right to alter or abolish their Constitution. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 122

(1998) ("The rights of 'the people' affirmed in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments may well
mean more than the right to alter or abolish, but surely they mean at least this much at their
core."). As I later explain, I believe that Amar is correct that the collective right to revolution is
one of the retained rights of the people. See infra note 217. Amar also has long recognized the
general federalist relationship of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. SeeAMAR, supra, at 123-24.
8. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1988) [hereinafter Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment]; Barnett, supra note 1; Randy E.
Barnett, Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE
HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 1 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993) [hereinafter
Barnett, Implementing the Ninth Amendment]; BARNETr, supra note 1; Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment].
9. See generally BARNETr, supranote 1; Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8.
10. See Lash, The Lost OriginalMeaning, supra note 1, at 343-47 (describing the difference
between active and passive interpretations of the Ninth Amendment).
11. See generally id.; Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence,supra note 1.
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enactment. 2 Although libertarian theorists like Professor Barnett correctly
read the Ninth Amendment as an active enforceable amendment and not a
mere passive statement of principle, the evidence suggests that a much
broader understanding of retained rights prevailed at the time of the
Founding than that proposed by the libertarian model. 13 The Ninth
Amendment was understood to preserve all retained rights, whether
individual, majoritarian, or collective, 4 from undue federal interference,
reserving control of the same to state majorities. This understanding makes
the Ninth Amendment an active federalist provision that calls upon courts to
limit the interpretation of enumerated federal power in order to preserve
the people's retained right to local self-government.
Recognizing the challenge this evidence presents to libertarian theories
of the Constitution, Professor Barnett has now drafted a response to both my
work and the work of others on the Ninth Amendment.15 In his response,
Barnett concedes that the evidence supports either an active federalist or
active libertarian reading of the Ninth Amendment.' 6 However, Barnett
downplays the significance of his conclusion due to his belief that nothing in
the federalist model is necessarily7 inconsistent with his own libertarian
reading of the Ninth Amendment.'
Because my articles concentrated more on historical evidence than the
construction of constitutional theory, the specific differences and similarities
between the libertarian and federalist readings of the Ninth Amendment
remained unclear.' For example, Professor Barnett and I both concede the

12.
See generally Lash, The LostJurisprudence,supranote 1.
13. See generally Lash, The Lost OriginalMeaning, supra note 1.
14. For a discussion of each of these categories as retained rights under the Ninth
Amendment, see Kurt T. Lash, Federalism, Freedom, and the Founders' View of Retained Rights: A
Reply to Randy Barnett, 60 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2008).
15.
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8.
16. See id. at 21 ("[E]vidence supporting a federalism function of the Ninth Amendment
can be viewed as logically consistent with both the individual and collective rights models."); id.
at 79 ("[T]he evidence considered in this Article, taken cumulatively, strongly supports the
individual natural rights model of the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment as well as the
federalism model .... ").
17. See id. at 62. Barnett writes:
But even if [retained rights include state rights,] this is not logically inconsistent
with a reading of the Ninth Amendment as protecting both individual and states'
rights from a latitudinarian interpretation of the enumerated powers. Were states'
rights included in the meaning along with individual rights, it would simply
broaden the scope of the Ninth Amendment to include situations where no
individual liberty rights were at issue.
Id. (internal citation omitted). Indeed, Barnett insists that I have misled readers into thinking
our two approaches to the Ninth Amendment are somehow incompatible. Id. at 79.
18. For example, despite my expressly stating otherwise, Barnett still believes I might be
arguing that the Ninth Amendment protects only majoritarian rights. Compare Lash, The Lost
OriginalMeaning, supra note 1, at 401 ("[T]here is no textual reason and little historical reason
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possibility that the retained rights of the Ninth Amendment include both
individual and collective rights. We also both agree that the Ninth
Amendment is "federalist" to the extent that it binds only the federal
government and not the states. Perhaps, then, Barnett and I are merely
focusing on two sides of the same coin: he, emphasizing the libertarian side
of the Ninth Amendment; I, emphasizing the collective (or federalist) side.
How much substantive difference can there be between these two positions?
Quite a bit, it turns out. Barnett's libertarian Ninth Amendment is the
mirror image of his libertarian reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause. He believes that these two Amendments
work in tandem to protect the same set of unenumerated individual rights
and justify judicial enforcement of these rights against both state and federal
action.' 9 Under my reading of the Ninth Amendment, however, the original
federalist aspect of the Amendment remains in force and requires judicial
protection of local self-gqvernment todayjust as it did in 1791. Not only is it
logically impossible for the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to protect
the same set of rights, the Ninth Amendment forbids reading the Privileges
or Immunities Clause as negating the general police powers of the state.
Thus, if my reading of the Ninth Amendment is correct, it would
significantly undermine Barnett's theory of a libertarian Constitution.
My prior two articles in the Texas Law Review were meant to provide
an exhaustive account of recently uncovered historical materials involving
the Ninth Amendment. Even now, however, I continue to discover
previously unknown documents that involve early discussion and application
of the Ninth Amendment. The most significant of these new discoveries are
presented for the first time in this Article. The purpose of this Article,
however, is to focus on those aspects of the historical record that have
particular significance in the federalist versus libertarian debate. Following a
roughly chronological approach, this Article summarizes the relevant
evidence and addresses Professor Barnett's arguments as it proceeds. In the
penultimate Section, I consider the relationship between the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments.'

to believe that the 'other fights' of the Ninth Amendment did not include natural rights."), with
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 20 ("Here and elsewhere in his two articles, Lash
appears to suggest that the active federalism approach is meant to protect only collective
rights."). As I hope this Article makes clear, I believe the evidence strongly suggests that the
Ninth Amendment protected both majoritarian and individual rights. Barnett's confusion arises
from my argument that the Ninth Amendment leaves all such rights under the collective
control of local state majorities. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
19.
See, e.g., BARNETr, supra note 1, at 66 (stating that the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments both "refer to the same set of unenumerable rights").
20. Lash, The Lost OriginalMeaning, supra note 1; Lash, The LostJurisprudence,supra note 1.
21. This last Section by necessity must be no more than a sketch. For a more
comprehensive text-based theory of the Ninth Amendment, see Kurt T. Lash, A TextualHistoricalTheory, supra note 1.
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II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS: DEFINING TERMS AND APPROACH
A.

Two STORIES

Behold two stories of the Ninth Amendment:
1. The Libertarian Account
The Ninth Amendment is James Madison's unique and personal
contribution to our Constitution. Like other Founders, Madison shared the
belief that the retained natural rights of man require no enumeration
(indeed, they cannot be enumerated). Madison added the Ninth
Amendment in order to prevent the erroneous assumption that the rights
listed in the Bill of Rights were the only individual rights retained by the
people. Although the Ninth Amendment (and the Bill of Rights as a whole)
originally restricted only the federal government, the natural rights of
individuals deserve protection from any government, including state
governments. However, it was not until the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868 that the Constitution authorized the courts to protect
unenumerated natural rights against both state and federal governments.
Although no court prior to 1965 embraced such a view of the Ninth
Amendment, it is only due to historic accident and erroneous judicial
interpretations that we have lost sight of this original meaning. In short, the
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments work in tandem, accomplishing similar
goals, through different means.
2.

The Federalist Account

The Ninth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, has its roots
in proposals submitted by the state ratifying conventions. In addition to a
provision prohibiting the exercise of unenumerated powers, the state
conventions also demanded an amendment prohibiting any implied
enlargement of enumerated federal power due to the enactment of the Bill
of Rights. Madison's original draft of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
expressly addressed these particular concerns of the states. Although the
final version of the Ninth Amendment spoke only of the retained rights of
the people, Madison insisted that preserving retained rights and
constraining federal power amounted to the same thing and that the final
version continued to express the same federalist principle demanded by the
state conventions. This is how Madison described the Ninth Amendment in
a major speech while the Amendment was under consideration, and this is
how every scholar and court read the Ninth Amendment for the next onehundred years. Although the Fourteenth Amendment adds additional
restrictions upon the states, it does not negate the purpose or operation of
the Ninth Amendment. In short, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were
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meant to work in tandem, accomplishing similar goals, through different
means.
Professor Barnett advocates the first account. The second reflects my
reading of the historical evidence. Not all aspects of these two accounts are
mutually exclusive. As I noted above, the federalist model accepts Barnett's
contention that individual natural rights were among the retained rights of
the people. The key difference between the two accounts involves the scope
and purpose of the Ninth Amendment. The libertarian Ninth Amendment
comes into play whenever a forbidden construction of the Constitution
threatens an individual natural right. The federalist Ninth Amendment, on
the other hand, is triggered any time federal power is unjustifiably extended,
regardless of whether the extension affects an individual or non-individual
right, such as the collective right to local self-government. This distinction is
important for two reasons. First, the federalist model2 2 embraces a much
broader category of rights than that proposed by the libertarian model.
Second, the broad category of rights protected under the federalist model
cannot be reconciled with Barnett's attempt to read the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments as protecting the same set of liberties and
cumulatively justifying a "presumption of liberty" in matters the Founders
meant to leave to state control.
The libertarian account of the Ninth Amendment may seem more
intuitively plausible since it tracks modern conceptions of rights and
liberties. The federalist model, on the other hand, stresses long contested
notions of "states' rights" and, from a modern perspective, seems to suggest
an overwrought fear of the federal government. Nevertheless, if the goal is
to recover the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment, one must see

22. In his work, Barnett appears to equate the federalism model with limiting the scope of
federal power. Under this definition, Barnett is correct to see close similarities between the
"federalist" model (which limits federal power) and his "libertarian" model (which limits both
state and federal power). He distinguishes this approach from what he calls the "collectivist"
model of the Ninth Amendment that views the Amendment as preserving local majoritarian or
collective rights. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 15-17. Barnett's use of the
term "federalism" diverges from standard usage of the term as a reference to a theory of divided
government, with some matters delegated to the national government and others left under the
autonomous control of local majorities. Barnett's categories also obscure the historical
situations in which retained rights had a dual nature, being both individual and collective at the
same time. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. As I have argued in previous articles, I
continue to distinguish "libertarian" models of the Ninth Amendment (limiting the power of
the federal governments to interfere with individual rights in furtherance of an overall theory of
liberty against state and federal governments) and "federalism" models of the Ninth
Amendment (dividing federal and state power in a manner that preserves the retained right to
local self-government). I believe my approach conforms with standard usage, and it allows for
the existence of retained rights that were both individual (in terms of their protection from
federal interference) and collective (in terms of their being retained under the control of local
state majorities).
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terms like "the retained rights of the people" through the eyes of those who
debated and ratified the text. Even if one is more concerned with the
present than the past, today there is a growing appreciation of how
preserving the right to local self-government plays a liberty-enhancing role
in matters ranging from medicinal use of marijuana to physician-assisted
suicide to affirmative-action programs in the public schools. Thus, more
than just originalists may be interested in recovering the original
understanding of the Ninth Amendment.
A recurring theme in what follows is the need to hesitate before
ascribing modern implications to terms like "fights" and the retained
prerogatives of "the people." What today might seem to have a single
meaning in 1791 might have referred to a complicated set of concerns
involving both individual and local majoritarian liberty. Those who debated
and ratified the Ninth Amendment were faced with a problem altogether
new in political science: how to create a federalist system of government
whereby both the national and local governments remained sovereign in
their respective spheres. Such a division of power had no historical
counterpart. 23 Describing it and debating its merits required a new
language; older terms had to be reconceptualized and adapted to a new
theory of divided government.24 For example, in 1787, the idea of individual
natural rights had deep roots in the common law. The need to protect such
rights at a state level was commonly accepted, even if disputes remained
regarding the precise content of natural rights. At the same time, however,
sovereign states also had natural rights that they retained when they entered
into a treaty or compact with another sovereign.2 ' The Articles of
Confederation, for example, declared that all non-delegated powers,

23.

See Michael Zuckert, A System Without Precedent: Federalism in the American Constitution, in

THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 132 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis

J.

Mahoney eds., 1987).
24. SeeAkhil Reed Amar, OfSovereignty and Federalism,96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1437 (1987).
25.
See generally EMERICH DE VATEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1758). Vattel's work was widely
relied upon at the time of the country's founding and for decades afterward. The first major
constitutional treatise by St. George Tucker relied heavily on Vattel. See, e.g., St. George Tucker,
View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED

STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. Note D (St. George Tucker ed., Phila.,

William

Young

Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
Others in the founding generation shared Vattel's view that governments in
general, and states in particular, had retained natural rights. See, e.g., Kentucky Resolutions 10
Nov. 1798, 14 Nov. 1799, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 131, 134 n.* (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (noting that Thomas Jefferson's draft stated in part that
"every State has a natural right in cases not within the compact.., to nullify of their own
authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits"); see also JOHN TAYLOR,
CONSTRUCTIONS CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 172 (Leonard W. Levy ed., De
Capo Press 1970) (1820) ("The states have a natural right to make all necessary and proper laws
within their national powers reserved .... ").
COMMENTARIES].
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jurisdiction, and rights were retained by the states. 26 If state conventions were
to ratify the Constitution, the Founders had to convince them that the
federal government not only lacked power to interfere with individual rights
but also lacked the authority to interfere with the retained collective rights
of the people in the several states. In this way, debates regarding individual
rights merged with debates regarding states' rights. These dual concerns
played a critical role in the drafting and public understanding of the Ninth
Amendment.
B.

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND METHOD

Professor Barnett and I both embrace the method of constitutional
interpretation known as originalism. Originalism seeks the meaning of the
text as it was likely understood by those who added the provision to the
Constitution. The method can be traced back to the Founding generation
itself. James Madison, for example, expressly embraced the idea that the
meaning of the Constitution should reflect the understanding of the
ratifiers-in his case, the members of the state ratifying conventions. ' 7 As
Madison stated during the 1796 debate on the Jay Treaty:
[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men
who formed our Constitution, the sense of that body could never
be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the Constitution.
As the instrument came from them it was nothing more than the
draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were
breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the
several State Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the
meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we
must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed,
but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the
28
Constitution.

Madison's emphasis on the ratifiers' understanding reflects the
Founders' belief in popular sovereignty. A political theory in ascendancy at
the time of the Founding, popular sovereignty distinguishes the government

26. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (U.S. 1781) ("Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not
by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.").
27. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944, 1946, 1951 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison). Madison
relied on the understanding of the state conventions even before the states had ratified the Bill
of Rights, and he would repeatedly do so throughout his life. See id. at 1951 (statement of Rep.
Madison) ("The explanations in the state conventions all turned on the same fundamental
principle [Congress could not abridge the retained powers of the states], and on the principle
that the terms necessary and proper gave no additional power to those enumerated.").
28. James Madison, The Jay Treaty Speech (Apr. 6, 1796), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF MADISON]; see also 5 ANNALS
OF CONG. 776 (1796) (statement of Rep. Madison).
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from the governed, with only the latter having the sovereign right to
establish (or amend) fundamental law.2 The governed "speak as a People"
when they meet in convention and debate, vote, and reduce to writing the
people's fundamental law. 30 Because these conventions of the people are
responsible for "breathing life" into the document, it is their understanding
of the words that controls.
Most originalists today accept popular sovereignty as the normative basis
for their interpretive method and follow Madison's lead in treating the
understanding of the ratifiers as the most authoritative word on the original
meaning of the Constitution."' The originalist work of Professor Barnett,
however, is an exception. Although Barnett accepts the legitimacy of
originalism (at least provisionally), 32 he strongly rejects popular sovereignty
as a normative theory of constitutional law. According to Barnett, no person
can be bound to follow the Constitution without his or her consent. Because
unanimous consent is impossible, consent-based theories fail to bind in
conscience anyone who does not individually consent to the Constitution. 3
Popular sovereignty is thus a flawed theory, for it allows a supermajority
(both at the time of adoption and through later use of Article V) to bind a
non-consenting minority. Barnett believes the only way around this
unanimous-consent dilemma is to adopt a constitution that would earn the
consent of all reasonable people-a constitution based on libertarian
principles of freedom. It is because Barnett believes that the original

29. See, e.g., John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States of America, in 6 THE WORKS OFJOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
116 (Boston, Little & Brown 1851). As Adams stated:
It is indeed a "most excellent maxim, that the original and fountain of all just
power and government is in the people;" and if ever this maxim was fully
demonstrated and exemplified among men, it was in the late American
Revolution, where thirteen governments were taken down from the foundation,
and new ones elected wholly by the people, as an architect would pull down an old
building and erect a new one.
Id. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787

(1998).
30.
31.

See WOOD, supra note 29, at 328-43 (describing the special legitimacy of conventions).
See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993); MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1986); KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
32. See BARNETf, supra note 1, at 109 ("If the substance of a constitution's original
meaning falls short of what it takes to establish a legitimate lawmaking process, then that
constitution is not binding and can be ignored despite the fact it is in writing.").
33. See id. at 11-14 ("I challenge the idea, sometimes referred to as 'popular sovereignty,'
that the Constitution of the United States was or is legitimate because it was established by 'We
the People' or the 'consent of the governed.'").
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that he accepts the
meaning of the Constitution meets this condition
34
legitimacy of originalism as an interpretive method.
Professor Barnett's rejection of popular sovereignty places him in the
uncomfortable position of rejecting the very political theory embraced by
those who debated and adopted the Ninth Amendment. 35 This is not a
criticism of Barnett's normative theory (as he may well be correct about
constitutional legitimacy). But, as Barnett himself concedes, "[P]articular
items of evidence assume a greater or lesser importance depending on
which version of originalism is being employed."3 6 Popular sovereignty-based
originalism gives substantial weight to the understanding of the ratifiers, for
it is their action and authority that "breathes life" into the constitutional
text. Professor Barnett, however, distinguishes "original public meaning"
from "original ratifiers' understanding," with his preference being the
former.3 7 This distinction has real bite in Barnett's work. A theme running
throughout his work involves how the Ninth Amendment does not reflect the
concerns declared by the state ratifying conventions.38 As explained below, I
believe that Barnett's rejection of the Founders' theory of popular
sovereignty critically undermines his analysis of the historical evidence. For
now, the reader should know that the originalist approach of this Article
follows the popular sovereigntist originalism of James Madison and affords
concerns and understanding of
special consideration and weight to the
39
those who debated and ratified the text.
C. THE POOL OFRELEVANTEVDENCE
The search for original meaning is not the same as a search for the
original Framers' private intent. On this point, Professor Barnett and I
agree. Whatever private intentions may have motivated the players in this
history, the key inquiry is determining the likely public meaning of a
proposed text. This is the meaning that is debated and either rejected or
ratified. For that reason, although Barnett and I might give some sources
different weight, we generally look to the same historical sources as relevant
to determining the original meaning of the text. Contemporary use of
phrases and terms in the text is relevant, and this can be identified through
34.

Id. at 109-13.

35. See Trevor Morrison, Lamenting Lochner 's Loss: Randy Barnett's Case for a Libertarian
Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 839, 846 (2005) (arguing that Barnett's rejection of the
original theory of the Constitution places him in "a rather awkward position").

36. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supranote 8, at 6.
37. See id. at 5-6.
38. See, e.g., id. at 17 ("Madison designed the Ninth Amendment by substantially altering
state proposals to address the concerns expressed during ratification by Federalistsupporters of
the Constitution.").
39. Other constitutional scholars who base their work on the theory of popular
sovereignty include Akhil Reed Amar, Keith E. Whittington, Bruce Ackerman, Michael Kent
CurtisJohn Harrison, Michael McConnell, Michael Paulson, Caleb Nelson, and Gary Lawson.
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public documents (newspapers, official enactments, and the like) or private
letters and diaries. The issue that gave rise to the proposed text is clearly
relevant, as are the debates that surrounded its drafting, submission, and
ratification. Private statements by those involved are helpful, but only to the
extent that the statements illuminate likely public understanding.
Post-adoption materials can be relevant, depending on the date of the
material and the degree to which it reflects the original understanding as
opposed to later political disputes. Although Professor Barnett downplays
the significance of post-adoption commentary in the case of the Ninth
Amendment, this is a departure from his work on other clauses in the
Constitution. 40 I believe that post-adoption commentary and usage is
particularly helpful in the case of the Ninth Amendment, 4' but none of my
conclusions are dependent on post-enactment material.
III.

THE CONCERNS THAT TRIGGERED THE NINTH AMENDMENT

The commonly told story about the birth of the Ninth Amendment
recounts how the Amendment was meant to prevent any erroneous
implications arising from the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 42 Identifying
these erroneous implications, however, leads to one of the first differences
between the federalist and libertarian accounts of the Ninth Amendment.
The federalist reading views the Ninth Amendment as having the dual
purpose of both restraining power and retaining rights-concerns that the
state ratifying conventions raised as part of their demands for a Bill of
Rights. Professor Barnett's libertarian reading, on the other hand, asserts
that the Ninth Amendment had the single purpose to protect retained
individual rights43 and that it reflects concerns raised by the Federalists who

originally supported ratification of the Constitution without a Bill of Rights.
A.

THE TRADITIONAL AccouNT OF THE NINTH AMEADMENT

Most accounts of the Ninth Amendment focus on Madison's speech to
the House of Representatives where he introduced his proposed Bill of

40. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text (discussing Barnett's use of postadoption commentary in his analysis of the Second Amendment).
41. See generally Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence,supra note 1 (documenting how the Ninth
Amendment played a significant role in some of the most important constitutional disputes in
American history).
42.

See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH AMENDMENT

AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOW THEY HAVE 39 (2007).

43. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 2 ("The purpose of the Ninth
Amendment was to ensure that all individual natural rights had the same stature and force after
some of them were enumerated as they had before; and its existence argued against a
latitudinarian interpretation of federal power."); id. at 13 ("I have defended the view that the
'other rights' protected by the Ninth Amendment are individual natural rights. The purpose of
the Ninth Amendment was to ensure that these rights had the same stature and force after
enumeration as they had before." (internal citation omitted)).
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Rights.44 There, Madison noted that the Federalists had originally resisted a
Bill of Rights due to the danger that such a bill might erroneously be read as
an exhaustive list of the people's retained rights. According to Madison, this
danger might be "guarded against" by adopting a provision that expressly
prohibited such an erroneous implication.45 The provision he proposed
ultimately became the Ninth Amendment.
This is an accurate, but critically abbreviated, account of the
Amendment's birth. It makes it appear as if the provision sprang from the
mind of Madison and reflected Federalist concerns, not those of the state
conventions. Professor Barnett, for example, believes that the Ninth
Amendment was "formulated specifically to respond" to Federalist
objections to adding a Bill of Rights4 6 and that securing retained rights was
the "single end" of Madison's proposal.4 7 If true, this makes the Ninth
Amendment unique among the rest of the Bill of Rights. All the other
provisions in the Bill of Rights have their roots in proposals emanating from
48
the state conventions and reflect their particular concerns. Although he
concedes that state conventions submitted proposals related to the Ninth
Amendment, Barnett nevertheless maintains that Madison "substantially
alter[ed] state proposals" in order to focus on concerns regarding the
people's retained rights. 49 As Barnett puts it: "In this regard, within the Bill
of Rights, the Ninth Amendment is sui generis .... Madison's version of the
Ninth Amendment was a departure from, rather than an incorporation of,
the public meaning of similarly worded Anti-Federalist-inspired state
proposals ...."50 Barnett's account uncouples the Ninth Amendment from
the rest of the Bill of Rights and, in so doing, distances it from the statecentered concerns informing the rest of the Bill of Rights.
I believe the evidence supports Professor Barnett's claim that one of the
purposes of the Ninth Amendment was to address concerns about adding a
Bill of Rights. 5 However, Madison himself expressly rebuts Barnett's attempt
to drive a wedge between Madison's Ninth Amendment and concerns

44.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).

45.

Id. at 449-50 (statement of Rep. Madison).

46.

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supranote 8, at 25.

47.
Id. at 54.
48.
For a helpful comparison of the amendments and their state precursors, see BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Leon Friedman ed., 1971).
49.

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 17.

50.

Id.; see also id. at 75 ("[T]he Ninth Amendment was invented by James Madison. ...").

51.
Actually, it is misleading to characterize the dangers of adding a Bill of Rights as solely
a Federalist concern or to claim that Anti-Federalists inspired the proposals from the states. The
proposed amendments from the state conventions clearly echo the "dangerous implications"
concern, and men like Edmund Randolph, whom Madison called a "friend of the [proposed]
Constitution," championed them. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 4,
1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 221-22 (1905) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION]; see also infra Part III.C.
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emanating from the states on at least five different occasions. 52 According to
Madison, the Ninth Amendment had the dual purpose of guarding retained
rights and limiting undue enlargement of federal power-and it is this
second purpose that ties the Ninth to the concerns and proposals of the
state conventions.
B. MADISON'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Here are Madison's
Amendments:

original

drafts

of the

Ninth

and Tenth

The exceptions, here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish
the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to
enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as
actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.
The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor 53prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively.
These two amendments address two different and equally erroneous
readings of the Constitution. The first, his original draft of the Ninth
Amendment, addresses retained rights and the erroneous enlargement of
enumerated federal power. The second, a draft of the Tenth Amendment,
addresses the erroneous exercise of unenumerated federal power. As Madison
later explained, the former guards against "a latitude of interpretation"
while the latter "exclud[es]
every source of power not within the
54
Constitution itself."
Although Madison's original draft of the Ninth Amendment addresses
both enlarged powers and retained rights, in Madison's mind these two
subjects were inextricably linked:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow, by implication, that those rights which were not
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General
Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the
most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it
may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see

52.
53.
54.

See infra.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452-53 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
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by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution (the original
draft of the Ninth Amendment] .
According to Madison, disparagement of unenumerated rights led to
the implied "assignment" of such rights into the hands of the general
government. Such an implied assignment, of course, would wrongfully
enlarge the powers of the federal government. Madison's original draft of
the Ninth Amendment addresses both of these related problems by
guarding "retained rights" and prohibiting constructions that "enlarge[d]
the powers" of the federal government. This same dual purpose shows up in
Madison's notes for his speech where he writes in regard to the Ninth
Amendment: "disparage other rights-or constructively enlarge. 56 His notes
thus track the express dual-purpose language contained in his original draft
of the Amendment.
Nor is there any evidence that, of the two listed purposes, retaining
rights was the "true" or "main" purpose of the Ninth Amendment and that
constraining power was just a means to that end. Both the text of the
Amendment and Madison's notes treat both purposes as equally important.
In fact, Madison's private musings on the subject focused on the need to
prevent enlarged federal power. Only months earlier, Madison had written
to Thomas Jefferson regarding the need for a Bill of Rights: "My own
opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed
as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration.
In sum, Madison's private correspondence, his speech, and the notes
his
speech all expressly link the Ninth Amendment to preventing
for
enlarged federal power. In the face of such express evidence, it is not
credible to maintain that Madison's sole purpose in proposing the Ninth
Amendment was to preserve individual rights. Madison was just as
concerned about the enlargement of federal power, and this concern came
straight from the state conventions.
C.

THE PROPOSALS OF THE STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS

Unlike Madison's original draft, the final language of the Ninth
Amendment refers only to rights, not powers. Because this particular
55.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison) (emphasis added).

56. JAMES MADISON, SPEECH TO THE HOUSE EXPLAINING His PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WITH
NOTES FOR THE AMENDMENTS SPEECH (1789), reprinted in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 65 (Randy E. Barnett ed.,

1989). Although Barnett discusses some aspects of Madison's notes, he does not address the
lines that refer to the Ninth Amendment. Moreover, although our received account of his
speech does not include his point about enlarged power, Madison may have been forced to
limit his remarks according to time constraints, a possibility Barnett also acknowledges. See
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 34 n.135 (noting Madison's self-reminder "watch
Time" in his notes).
57. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 WRITINGS OF
MADISON, supranote 28, at 271 (emphasis added).
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language cannot be found in any proposal submitted by the state
conventions, some scholars conclude that the Ninth Amendment was solely
Madison's idea. 58 According to this view, the Ninth Amendment reflects
Federalist concerns that a list of rights might be read as an exhaustive list of
the people's retained rights. Anti-Federalist concerns about government
powers, on the other hand, were addressed by the Tenth Amendment.
Reading Madison's original draft of the Ninth Amendment, however,
calls this distinction into question. Madison viewed the Amendment as
addressing both rights and powers. Madison's speech to the House clearly
links the purpose of the Ninth Amendment to concerns about enlarged
federal power, a critical concern of the state conventions. It flips history on
its head to say that the Federalists, but not the Anti-Federalists, were
concerned about implied enlargement of federal power. In fact, once one
considers the declarations and proposals submitted by the state conventions,
the link between Madison's Ninth Amendment and the state conventions
becomes clear.
Like Madison's draft of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the state
conventions also saw the need for a dual strategy to prevent a dangerous
expansion of federal power. New York, for example, submitted the following
declarations along with its notice of ratification:
[T] hat every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States,
or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the
people of the several states, or to their respective state governments
to whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in
the said Constitution, which declare that Congress shall not have or
exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to
any powers not given by the said Constitution; but such clauses are
to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or
as inserted merely for greater caution.5 9

58. In addition to Professor Barnett, the historian Leonard Levy also credited Madison
with conceiving the Ninth Amendment entirely on his own. See LEONARD LEw, ORIGINS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 247 (1999) ("Madison improvised that proposal. No precise precedent for it
existed.").
59. Ratification by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in I THE DEBATES INTHE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

327 (Jonathan

Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]; see also id. at 329. In ratifying the Constitution,
the New York Convention also declared:
Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be
abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the
said Constitution, and in confidence that the amendments which shall have been
proposed to the said Constitution will receive an early and mature
consideration,-We, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the
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The first of these declarations states the principle of enumerated
power-a principle that ultimately informs the Tenth Amendment. The
second addresses a separate issue-the implied expansion of federal power
that might arise due to the addition of the Bill of Rights. Other states
expressed the same two concerns. The Virginia Convention, for example,
proposed the following two amendments:
1st. That each state in the Union shall respectively retain every
power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Constitution
delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the
departments of the federal government."

17th. That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not
exercise certain powers, be not interpreted, in any manner
whatsoever, to extend the powers of Congress; but that they may be
construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers
where this shall be the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for
greater caution. 60
Once again, the first (Virginia's "First") provision limits the federal
government to enumerated powers, while the second (Virginia's
"Seventeenth") limits the implied enlargement of federal power due to the
addition of a bill of rights. 61 North Carolina followed Virginia's approach

people of the state of New York, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the said
Constitution.
Id.
60. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 59, at 657, 659, 661. James Madison was a member of the committee that
drafted the Virginia proposal, and he expressly noted the role the Virginia proposals played in
his proposed draft of the Bill of Rights. Letter from James Madison to George Washington
(Nov. 20, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 28, at 425.
61. Although New York's declarations addressed the implied abandonment of the
principle of enumerated federal power, Virginia's Seventeenth goes further and prohibits any
implied enlargement of those powers that were enumerated. In the Virginia Convention,
Patrick Henry stated:
If you will, like the Virginian government, give them knowledge of the extent of
the rights retained by the people, and the powers themselves, they will, if they be
honest men, thank you for it.... But if you leave them otherwise, they will not
know how to proceed; and being in a state of uncertainty, they will assume rather
than give up powers by implication.
A bill of rights may be summed up in a few words. What do they tell us?-That our
rights are reserved.
Remarks of Patrick Henry, Debates in the Convention of the State of Virginia (June 14, 1788),
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 448. Here, Henry shows the relationship between
retained/reserved rights and limiting the constructive enlargement of power (by implication).
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and submitted the same two proposals.62 Other states submitted related
proposals seeking to limit the construction of federal power.6 3

62. Amendments Proposed by the North Carolina Convention (Aug. 1, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 240, 244, 246. Professor Barnett attempts to disparage
North Carolina's agreement with Virginia. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 45.
Barnett's point is to minimize the degree of agreement with Virginia's approach by making
North Carolina's proposals seem rote and ill-considered. Barnett bases his skepticism on a letter
from William Davie of North Carolina to James Madison in which Davie notes "[t]hat farrago of
amendments borrowed from Virginia is by no means to be considered as the sense of this
country." Letter from William R. Davie to James Madison (June 10, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 176. But Davie's comment went to the bulk of
Virginia's numerous proposals that Madison ultimately rejected. Davie did not mean to
disparage, however, those proposals by North Carolina that sought to limit the construction of
federal power-in particular, the provisions that echoed Virginia's First and Seventeenth. As
Davie goes on to write, he had
collected with some attention the objections of the honest and serious-they are
but few and perhaps necessary . . . . Instead of a Bill of rights attempting to
enumerate the rights of the individual or the State governments, they seem to
prefer some general negative confining Congress to the exercise of the powers
particularly granted, with some express negative restriction in some important
cases.
Id. at 177. Davie's letter indicates that even those North Carolinians who counted themselves
friends of the Constitution (Davie's "honest and serious" men) nevertheless shared the Virginia
convention's concerns about "state rights" and the need to limit the powers of Congress.
63. See Lash, The Lost Original Meaning, supra note 1, at 355-60. Barnett claims that in
previous work I have "greatly overstat[ed] the commonality of [New York's and Virginia's]
proposals." Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 43. According to Barnett:
[T] here is a major difference between the Virginia and New York proposed rules
of construction. Virginia's proposal speaks of the retention of "every power,
jurisdiction and right" in "each State in the Union." In contrast, New York's speaks
of "every Power, Jurisdiction and Right" remaining in "the People of the several
States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have granted
the same." In this manner, New York's proposal distinguishes between "the
People" and "State Governments" and reserves rights to the people, as opposed to
Virginia's which refers only to reserving rights to the states.
Id. at 44 (internal citations omitted). Although Barnett refers here to proposals Madison would
rely on in drafting the Tenth Amendment (not the Ninth Amendment), his point goes to the
meaning of "the people" in the Ninth Amendment. I have claimed that all of these state
proposals endorsed the addition of amendments that would protect the states' rights. See Lash,
The Lost Original Meaning, supra note 1, at 358. Barnett disagrees by pointing to New York's
proposals that seem to distinguish the rights of states from the rights of the people. Barnett
believes that Madison made the same distinction when he referred to the retained rights of the
people in the Ninth Amendment. But here Barnett falls into the trap of anachronism. Today
"the people" sounds in terms of individual rights, not state rights. This was not true in 1787, and
it was most certainly not true of the New York Convention. New York did not simply refer to
"the people." The Convention expressly declared all non-delegated power jurisdiction and
rights were reserved to "the people of the several states." Ratification by the New York
Convention (July 26, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 327. This is the precise
language that Barnett recognizes elsewhere as a declaration of state rights. See Barnett, The
Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 79 (referring to the precise same language in the Confederate
Constitution). As far as Virginia's reference to the states' retained rights is concerned, this
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Madison culled through the various proposals submitted by the state
conventions and "exclud[ed] every proposition of a doubtful & unimportant
nature."6 Although not all of Virginia's (or any state's) proposals made the
final cut, Madison considered the dual strategy of Virginia's First and
Seventeenth amendments important enough to add to his list of suggested
amendments. Thus, Madison's proposals included two amendments: one
declaring the principle of enumerated power and a separate amendment
prohibiting any implied enlargement of enumerated federal power.
Below is a side-by-side comparison of Madison's Ninth and Tenth and
Virginia's First and Seventeenth:

statement is no different from New York's reference to the retained rights of the people of the
states or to their respective state governments. All the Founders agreed that powers and rights
retained by the states were, in fact, powers and rights retained by the people in the several states
who could delegate them to their respective state governments as they saw fit. This was a
fundamental principle of popular sovereignty.
64. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 21, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF
MADISON, supra note 28, at 417-18.
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Virginia's "First"

The powers not delegated by this
constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States
respectively.

That each state in the Union shall
respectively retain every power,
jurisdiction, and right which is not
by this Constitution delegated to the
Congress of the United States or to
the departments of the federal
government.

Madison's "Ninth"

Virginia's "Seventeenth"

The exceptions, here or elsewhere
in the Constitution, made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be so
construed

That those clauses which declare that
Congress shall not exercise certain
powers, be not interpreted,

as to diminish the just importance of
other rights retained by the people,
or as to enlarge the powers
delegated by the constitution;

in any manner whatsoever, to extend
the powers of Congress;

but either as actual limitations of
such powers, or as inserted merely
for greater caution.

but that they may be construed
either as making exceptions to the
specified powers where this shall be
the case, or otherwise, as inserted
merely for greater caution.

A simple textual comparison of Madison's Ninth Amendment with
Virginia's Seventeenth amendment seems to rebut Professor Barnett's
attempt to characterize Madison's Ninth Amendment as • a 65 sui generis
provision unrelated to the concerns of the state conventions. With the
exception of the "rights retained by the people" language, his proposal has
clear counterparts in Virginia's Seventeenth proposal. Furthermore, we
cannot divorce Madison's unique "retained rights" language from the
concerns of the Virginia Convention. We know that Madison wished to
prevent an implied "assignment" of unenumerated rights to the federal

65.

Historians have been aware of the relationship between Virginia's Seventeenth

proposal and the Ninth Amendment for a long time. See Leslie W. Dunbar, James Madison and
the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REv. 627, 631 (1956). See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 48;
AMAR, supra note 7, at 121 (discussing both Virginia's and New York's statements as precursors
to the Ninth Amendment).
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government. 66 His language prevents such an "assignment" and, thus, fits
with Virginia's express concerns about the implied extension of federal
power. In other words, even if we exclude the major part of Madison's
proposal and focus only on the retained-rights language, this still reflects the
concerns of Virginia and other state conventions. By including the "enlarged
powers" language, the link to the state-convention proposals is obvious.
IV. THE FINAL LANGUAGE OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT

A.

THE ALTERED LANGUAGE

On July 21, 1789, the House of Representatives referred Madison's
proposed Bill of Rights to a select committee made up of one member from
67
each state. The Ninth Amendment emerged from this committee in what
would be its final form: "The enumeration in the constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."G8
There are no records of the committee's discussions or reasoning, so we
cannot know what led them to delete Madison's original language regarding
the implied enlargement of federal power. Although some scholars claim
that the language referencing powers was moved to the Tenth Amendment,
this clearly is not the case. The committee left Madison's proposed Tenth
Amendment unchanged. In addition, we know that the Tenth Amendment
addresses the issue of unenumerated power. The powers to which Madison
refers in his initial draft of the Ninth involved only the implied enlargement
of enumerated powers. This language was not moved to the Tenth; it simply
disappeared.
Thus, we are left with an amendment that, to modern eyes, seems
almost inescapably libertarian. Unlike the Tenth Amendment, the Ninth
Amendment does not mention the states; it only mentions "the people."
Also unlike the Tenth Amendment, there is no mention of governmental
powers, only "retained rights." No wonder Professor Barnett feels
comfortable declaring that the Ninth Amendment "means what it says,"
knowing that most contemporary readers will assume that the retained rights
of the people must be individual rights. 69 Our endeavor, however, is to
recover the public meaning of the Amendment circa 1789. As we shall see,

66. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
67. Id. at 690-91. The committee was comprised of: James Madison (Virginia), John M.
Vining (Delaware), Abraham Baldwin (Georgia), Roger Sherman (Connecticut), Aedanus
Burke (South Carolina), Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire), George Clymer (Pennsylvania),
Egbert Benson (New York), Benjamin Goodhue (Massachusetts), Elias Boudinot (New Jersey),
and George Gale (Maryland).
68.
1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 97 (Joseph Gales ed., 1820); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
69.

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supranote 8, at 80.
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"retained rights" in that period was a far richer concept than what we might
expect today. Similarly, where today we construe "the people" to mean a
single national people, at the time of the Founding, the idea of "the people"
was a complicated one indeed.
B.

THE PEOPLE'SRETAiNED RIGHTS

In establishingthat Govt. [federal government] the people retained other
Govts. [governments] capableof exercising such necessary and useful
powers as were not to be exercised by the General Government.
-James Madison"
[TIhere is a distinction, between the federal Powers vested in Congress,
and the sovereign Authority belonging to the several States, which is the
Palladiumof the private, and personalrights of the Citizen.
-- Samuel Adams7'
A llpower,jurisdiction,and rights of sovereignty, not granted by the people
by that instrument [the Constitution], or relinquished, are still retained by
them in their several states, and in their respective state legislatures,
accordingto theirforms of government.
7
-Samuel Chase 1
The Ninth Amendment speaks of "other rights" retained by the people.
Libertarians like Professor Barnett narrowly construe the Ninth as referring
to nothing more than individual rights. Although Barnett at times suggests
that these other rights might include majoritarian or collective rights,73 his
overall theory makes such a reading impossible. Barnett claims that the
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the same set of rights, and one
can no more apply a majoritarian right of local government against the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment than one can incorporate the
Tenth Amendment. The federalist reading of the Ninth Amendment,
however, gives the term "rights" full value. All non-delegated rights are
retained by the people, regardless of the nature of those rights.

70.

Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF

MADISON, supra note 28, at 452.

71.

Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Aug. 24, 1789), in CREATING THE

BILL OF RIGHTS 286 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).

72. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554-55 (Md. 1797).
73. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 16 ("It is possible that the 'other'
rights retained by the people were both individual and collective, in which case the collective
rights model identifies a potential application of the Ninth Amendment beyond the protection
of individual liberties.").
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The issue, then, is whether "retained rights" was understood narrowly to
include only individual natural rights or broadly to include all nondelegated rights. One way to determine the likely public meaning of a term
in the Constitution is to consider its common usage at the time of
ratification. Professor Barnett, for example, has conducted an exhaustive
investigation of uses of the phrase "to regulate" and the word "commerce" in
order to identify the original public meaning of the sentence: "Congress
74
states."
shall have power to regulate commerce among the several
Similarly, Barnett has investigated the term "bear arms" and the single word
"keep" in order to discern the likely public meaning of the broader
sentence: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." 75 For the Ninth Amendment, a similar approach would consider
common usage of the word "rights" or terms like "retained rights" and "the
people" in order to identify how the ratifiers would have interpreted the full
language of the Amendment.
In the case of the Ninth Amendment, however, Barnett declines to
engage in his usual search for common usage of constitutional words and
terms and instead asserts, without explanation, that the phrase "other rights
retained by the people" cannot be established by a systematic study. 76 It may
be that Barnett has not located examples of the exact phrase "other rights
retained by the people." That, of course, would be no surprise. There also
was no common usage of the exact phrases "regulate commerce among the
several states" or "the right of the people to keep and bear arms." As
Barnett's own work shows, however, this does not preclude investigation of
particular terms embedded within the broader text. An investigation of the
common usage of terms like "retained rights" and "the people" provides
important insights into the likely original public meaning of the Ninth
Amendment.
C. THE PEOP1E'SRETAINED RIGHTS AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the term "the people"
referred to the collective sovereign entity of the citizens of a given state. As
chronicled by Gordon Wood, the revolutionary experience created a
74.

See generally Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause

55 ARK L. REv. 847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The OriginalMeaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001).
75.
See generally Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service
in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM
G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL
SILENT (2002)).
76.
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 7; see also id. at 23 ("This is why, when
direct evidence of particular usage is unavailable (unlike, for example, with the Commerce
Clause), the formation of clear models is essential as a first step to adjudicating a dispute over

original meaning.").
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common belief that the ultimate source of sovereign power was found in the
people themselves, not in their government."v In England, the government
was (and is) 78 viewed as the highest representation of the English people. In
the United States, however, the most recent historical representation of the
people had been the colonial assemblies who continued to meet even when
outlawed by the English government. These assemblies or conventions of the
people, came to be viewed as the highest expression of sovereignty. 79 They,
and not the government, represented the people themselves. The people
meeting in convention apart from the ordinary institutions of government
had the sovereign right to establish the state's fundamental law. In this way,
the concept of popular sovereignty-the very idea of "the people"-first
emerged in reference to the people of a given state.80
As far as rights are concerned, scholars have long recognized the
Founders' widespread belief in retained individual natural rights. 8 ' However,
at the time of the Founding, there were a variety of rights deemed to be held
by the people in both their individual and collective capacities. Natural
rights, most often associated with the work of John Locke,8 2 were divided
between those given up in return for the benefits of a stable government
and those unalienable natural rights that could not legitimately be delegated
away.8 3 Political or civil rights involved those positive rights arising not from
nature itself, but from the nature of government. 84 In addition to individual
rights were collective rights, those held by the people as a collective entity.
The most famous of these is announced in the Declaration of
Independence, which declared the people's unalienable right to alter or

77. See generally WOOD, supra note 29; see also SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 32 (2005).
78. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 7-10 (1991).
79. WOOD,supranote 29, at 319-43.
80. See Amar, supra note 24, at 1446 ("[T]he revolutionary generation initially seemed to
have in mind the People of each state, and not the People of the United States as a whole.").
81. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 37 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Wjhenever
and however [government] is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights,
in order to vest it with requisite powers."); id. NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison) ("[T]he
transcendent law of nature and of nature's God . . . declares that the safety and happiness of
society, are the objects at which all political institution's aim ... ."); see also Sanford Levinson,
ConstitutionalRhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 155 (1988) ("[E]ven
moral skeptics.., do not deny that the founding generation, as a general matter, accepted the
idea of natural rights.").
82. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
83. See THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 37 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Whenever
government] is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to
vest it with requisite powers").
84. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
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abolish their form of government.8 5 In the period immediately following the
Revolution, all these rights ran against one's own state government.
The need to form a league with other states, however, called into play a
new kind of retained right. Under the Articles of Confederation, although
the Continental Congress had certain express powers, all powers and rights
not delegated were retained by the individual states. As declared by Article
II, "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."8 6 This declaration of
"states' rights" did not signal the abandonment of popular sovereignty and
the embrace of some kind of reified deity called a "state." The men who
87
drafted the Articles embraced the emerging theory of popular sovereignty.
Instead, the reference to the retained rights of the states was a shorthand
reference to the retained right of the people in their respective states to
local self-government."' This is a majoritarian right in that it preserves the
right of local majorities to make decisions regarding local municipal law. 89
When the Constitution was first proposed, the immediate issue was
whether it would erase the sovereign independence of the people in the
several states and consolidate U.S. citizens into a single undifferentiated
mass. However great the benefits of a national government, the proposed
constitution would never be ratified if it appeared the cost would be such a
consolidation."" Accordingly, advocates of the proposed constitution assured
the state conventions that the states would retain a substantial degree of

85. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[W]henever any Form
of Government becomes destructive of [unalienable rights], it is the Right of the People to alter
or to abolish it ....").

86.

THE ARTICLESOF CONFEDERATION art. II (U.S. 1781).

87.
See WOOD, supra note 29, at 354-63. The pre-constitutional commitment to popular
sovereignty in the states can be seen in the decision to call state constitutional conventions of

the people to reenact state constitutions adopted by the state legislature. State governments
were not "the people themselves" and had no authority to establish the fundamental laws of the
states. See id. at 328-43. Even the Tenth Amendment's reference to the reserved power of the
"states" could be viewed as a reference to the people in the several states. See Report on the
Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in 6 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 28, at 348 (stating the
term "states" in the Tenth Amendment and in the Virginia Resolutions "means the people
composing those political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity").
88. As Madison explained in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, which argued that the
Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, references to the rights of states can be
understood as references to the sovereign people of a given state. See Report on the Virginia
Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in 6 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 28, at 348.
89. The collective people of a state could then entire the right in their state constitution
or leave the issue to the majoritarian control of the political process. See 1 TuCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 25, app. Note D 151-53 (discussing state municipal
law as among the powers reserved to the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
90. See WOOD, supra note 29, at 524-32 (discussing the Federalists' assurances that the
proposed Constitution would not result in the consolidation of the states into a single national
mass).
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their sovereign independence. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in FederalistNo.
32: "The State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had, and which were not by that act exclusively delegated
to the United States." 91
In 1787, the Centinel, a pseudonymed advocate writing in the
Cumberland Gazette, supported the proposed constitution because
we retain all our rights, which we have not expressly relinquished
to the union. That section declares, that all legislative powers
herein given . . . shall be vested in Congress, etc. The legislative

powers which are not given therein, are surely not in Congress; and
if not in Congress, are retained by the several States, and secured
by their several constitutions.92
The Centinel saw no difference between "[our] retained rights" and the
retained powers of the states.
In the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry referred to the "retained
rights of the people" and the "retained rights of the states" as if they were
the same thing:
If you intend to reserve your unalienable rights, you must have the
most express stipulation; for, if implication be allowed, you are
ousted of those rights. If the people do not think it necessary to
reserve them, they will be supposed to be given up. How were the
congressional rights defined when the people of America united by
a confederacy to defend their liberties and rights against the
tyrannical attempts of Great Britain? The states were not then
contended with implied reservation. No, Mr. Chairman. It was
expressly declared in our Confederation that every right was
retained by the states, respectively,
which was not given up to the
93
government of the United States.
Henry spoke of how the retained rights of the people of America were
protected by the Articles' express declaration that the respective states
retained all non-delegated rights. Many states, including Virginia, proposed
that a similar reservation of rights be added to the Federal Constitution.
Notice how Henry merges the language of individual rights with that of state
autonomy. Retained rights, whatever their specific nature, were collective in
regard to the federal government because retained rights were left to the
control of the collective people in the states. The North Carolina

91.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

92. The Centinel, Letter to the Editor, Some Objections to the New Constitution Considered,
CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Dec. 13, 1787, at 1, available at Archive of Americana,

America's Historical Newspapers, 1690-1876 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.).
93. Remarks of Patrick Henry, Debates in the Convention of the State of Virginia (June
14, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 59, at 445-46.
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Convention, for example, declared that "the people have a right to freedom
of speech"-an individual right-but then went on to assert the Constitution
be amended such that "each state in the Union shall respectively retain every
power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Constitution delegated" to
the federal government-a collective right. 94 Federalist advocates of the

proposed constitution stressed the same idea-the people retained collective
rights on a state-by-state basis. According to Madison in The FederalistPapers:
The truth is, that this ultimate redress [political removal at the
polls] may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the
federal than of the State legislatures, for the plain reason, that as
every act of the former, will be an invasion of the rights of the
latter, these will ever be ready to mark the innovation, to sound the
alarm to the people, and to exert their local influence in affecting a
change of federal representatives.95
The same language of the retained rights of the collective people
occurred outside the debates over the Federal Constitution. In 1791, the
same year as the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed resolutions expressing the "sense" of the assembly, that the states
need not wait for federal consent to call out the state militia when faced with
imminent danger (in this case, Indian attacks) because states "retain the
right of taking up arms in their own defense."96 Similarly, Madison's former
colleague in the House of Representatives (and future governor of Georgia),
James Jackson, wrote a series of essays in 1795 under the name Sicilius,
criticizing the Yazoo-land fraud scandal.97 In his third essay, Jackson
considered whether the Georgia legislature had authority to sell off the
western lands. In doing so, he discussed the proper method to determine
whether the people have delegated power to their governments:
It is a part of some constitutions, and understood in them all, that
all power, not expressly given, is retained by the people. On this
ground it was that Judge Wilson, of the supreme court, whatever

94.

Amendments Proposed by the North Carolina Convention (Aug. 1, 1788), in 4

ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 244.

95. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 286 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96. Senate of Pennsylvania,MAIL; CLAYPOOLE'S DAILY ADVERTISER (Phila.),Jan. 16, 1792, at
3, available at Archive of Americana, America's Historical Newspapers, 1690-1876 (Readex,
NewsBank, Inc.).
97. George R. Lamplugh, "Oh the Colossus! The Colossus!." James Jackson and the Jeffersonian
RepublicanParty in Georgia, 1796-1806, 9J. OF EARLY REPUBLIC 315 (1989).Jackson was a member
of the First Congress when Madison gave his speech against the Bank of the United States. Id. at
317-19. Jackson lost re-election in 1791 but was appointed to the Senate in 1792. Id. As
Lamplugh writes, "In a private letter to James Madison,Jackson linked the Yazoo speculation to
funding and assumption, the Bank of the United States, and John Jay's treaty with Britain as evil
fruits of Hamilton's loose construction of the Constitution." Id. at 319. Lamplugh refers to
Jackson's Letters of Sicilius as the "bible of the anti-Yazooists." Id.
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opinion his interest may dictate to him now, strenuously argued in
the convention of Pennsylvania, against the insertion of a bill of
rights, giving the best of reasons for its being left out, that it was
impossible to enumerate all the rights of the people, and that by
the expression of some the others might be supposed to be
delegated. The same arguments prevailed in the house of
representatives of the United States, on the proposed amendments
to the United States' constitution, when Messrs. Madison, Burke,
and others, wished to express some of the retained rights, and
surely the people of Georgia possess those retained rights, in as
great a degree, as those of other states. We have seen that
alienating or mortgaging public
lands, requires, in all governments,
98
an express fundamental law.
This is yet another example of how the rights "retained by the people"
could be viewed as rights "retained by the states." Jackson believed that
among the unenumerated retained rights of the people of Georgia was the
collective majoritarian right to "alienat[e] or mortgag[e] public land."
Notice that his argument about retained rights focuses on the very issue that
led to the adoption of the Ninth Amendment. He does not mention the
Ninth Amendment by name, but it is clear that Jackson considers
99
unenumerated retained rights to include federalist majoritarian rights.

98. JAMESJACKSON, THE LETTERS OF SICILIUS, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA,
ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY, THE POLICY, AND THE LEGALITY OF THE LATE SALE OF WESTERN
LANDS, IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA 23-24 (Augusta, Ga., John E. Smith 1795), availableat Archive
of Americana, Early American Imprints, Series 1: Evans, 1639-1800, No. 28889 (Readex,
NewsBank, Inc.).
99. Writing in response to Jackson's Sicilius essays, the author of a "Letter of a Farmer"
concedes that Georgia's right to alienate its land is one of the rights the state has retained from
the national legislature. THE LETTERS OF A FARMER TO THE PEOPLE OF GEORGIA: OR, THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY, POLICY, AND LEGALITY OF THE LATE SALES OF WESTERN LANDS EXAMINED 78 (Charleston, S.C, William P. Young 1796), available at Archive of Americana, Early American
Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800, No. 30689 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.). This, however, leaves
the Georgia legislature free to sell the land:
Suppose then we admit to give full weight and credit to those theorists, who
declaim against the proceedings of the last legislature, as unconstitutional; that the
power of alienating any part of the domain of the state, is one of the retained
rights of the people; that it is a power not delegated, either expressly or by
implication; and that the attempt of the national representatives to exercise it, is
usurpation? ... I take it, the power of each succeeding legislature is equal, where
the fundamental laws have undergone no change, and the last much reprobated
majority stood as high in their constitutional trust, as the majority of any former, or
after assemblage of the national representatives, under the same modification of
government: if this is true, and I scarcely think it can be denied, either the power
of alienating such part of the domain, as to the legislature shall appear beneficial is
delegated ....

THE INESCAPABLE FEDERALISM OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT

831

By stressing the common usage of "retained rights" as referring to the
collective rights of the people in the several states, I do not mean to imply
that retained rights did not also include retained individual rights. The
evidence strongly suggests that it did. As just one example, Madison
expressly referred to an individual's freedom of speech as one of the
retained natural rights of the people.100 There are many others.
Once again, however, the adoption of the Constitution complicated the
idea of "retained individual rights." Under a state constitution, retaining a
right meant restricting state power. Under the Federal Constitution,
however, retaining a right from the federal government by definition meant
leaving the matter to state control (assuming the Constitution did not also
expressly bind the states in the same matter). For example, although the
First Amendment prohibits any law respecting an establishment of religion,
states remained free to establish religion as they pleased in the decades
following the adoption of the Bill of Rights (and they did).' 0 ' Likewise, any
federal abridgment of the Speech and Press Clause necessarily intruded
upon matters reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Thus, even if
one views the "people" of the Ninth Amendment as referring to the
undifferentiated people of the United States, this same people has the
sovereign authority to divide powers and rights between national and state
governments-and clearly did so according to the terms of the Tenth
Amendment. As Madison put it, "In establishing that Govt. [federal
government] the people retained other Govts. [governments] capable of
useful powers as were not to be exercised by
exercising such necessary and
02
the General Government."

Farmer's response illustrates how opposite sides of a contemporary political debate
had the same view of retained fights. Such rights belong to the people of each state. The issue
dividing Sicilius and Farmer was whether the people of the state had delegated these rights to
their state legislature. In a similar vein, "Fabius" said:
The proposition was expressly made upon this principle, that the territory of such
extent as that of United America, could not be safely and advantageouslygoverned, but
by a combination of republics, each retainingall the rights of supreme sovereignty,
exceptingsuch as ought to be contributed to the union ....
JOHN DICKINSON, THE LETTERS OF FABIUS, IN 1788, ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AND IN
1797, ON THE PRESENT SITUATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 65-66 (Wilmington, Del., William C.
Smyth 1797), available at Archive of Americana, Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 16391800, No. 32042 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.).
100. JAMES MADISON, SPEECH TO THE HOUSE EXPLAINING His PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
WITH NOTES FOR THE AMENDMENTS SPEECH (1789), reprinted in I THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 64 (Randy E. Barnett ed.,
1989).
101.
Massachusetts, for example, did not abandon its official religious establishment until
1833. See LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 41-42 (2d ed., rev. 1994).
102.
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF
MADISON, supra note 28, at 452.
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Professor Barnett claims that "because the enumerated rights were
individual in nature, one may reasonably conclude that so too would be the
unenumerated rights retained by the people. " ° To the extent that Barnett
is trying to claim that unenumerated rights did not include collective rights,
this is simply incorrect and easily disproved.' °4 But even those aspects of the
people's retained rights which were individual in nature nevertheless had a
dual-aspect under the Ninth Amendment: They might be personal rights
retained from federal control, but this meant that they were left to local
majoritarian (collective) control. This is how Samuel Adams put it in a letter
to Richard Henry Lee in 1789:
I mean my friend, to let you know how deeply I am impressed with
a sense of the Importance of Amendments; that the good People
may clearly see the distinction, for there is a distinction, between
the federal Powers vested in Congress, and the sovereign Authority
belonging to the several States, which is the Palladium of the
private, and personal rights of the Citizen.'0 5
Adams here expresses a fundamental principle of federalism in the
early republic: Individual liberty is best protected by preserving local control
over "private and personal rights."
Both before and after 1791, it was just as common to speak of the
"retained rights of the states" as it was to view the "retained rights of the
people" as the equivalent of the retained rights of the people in their
respective states. This was true both of defenders and detractors of the
Federal Constitution, and the references occur both within and outside the
debates over adopting the Federal Constitution. It was no accident, in other
words, that the Bill of Rights bound only the federal government. Although
the first eight amendments did in fact protect personal rights, the intent and
effect of those protections was to leave control over such matters in the
collective hands of the people in the states.
In 1791, of course, the concept of the "people" was neither uniformly
understood nor uncontroversial. After all, the very notion of popular
sovereignty was relatively new, and the adoption of a Federal Constitution
created the conundrum of divided or dual sovereignty. Worse, the

103. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 26.
104. See discussion of Madison's Bank Speech, infra Part V.E, and discussion of St. George
Tucker, infra Part V.A.3. In The Ninth Amendment, Barnett sometimes seems to back away from
the claim that unenumerated rights only included individual rights. See Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment, supra note 8, at 16 (noting that the retained rights of the people may include
majoritarian collective rights). More recently, however, Barnett has taken a more aggressive
stance and insisted that the Ninth Amendment is purely "individualist" in its protection of
retained rights. See Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash's MajoritarianDifficulty: A Response to A TextualHistorical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REv. 937,946-48 (2008).
105. Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Aug. 24, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 71, at 286.
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Constitution's opening declaration of "We the People" remained critically
ambiguous in regard to whether this referred to "We the [single national]
people of the United States, or We the [many] People of the United States."'0 6
It was precisely because the term was capable of these different meanings
that the Federalists were compelled to assure the state conventions that the
term did not imply a consolidation of the states and the people therein into
a single mass.07
In later decades, nationalists such as ChiefJustice John Marshall and his
admiring associate on the Supreme Court, Justice Joseph Story, claimed that
"the People" were indeed a single united mass of citizens who only
happened to live in several states. °s Both jurists rejected the compact theory
of the Constitution embraced by theorists like St. George Tucker'°9 and
presented their own broad view of federal power. Cases like McCulloch v.
Maryland,"o Cohens v. Virginia," and Gibbons v. Ogden11 articulated a
106.

See, e.g., Substance of the Debate, in the House of Representatives, on the Suability of the State,

INDEP. CHRON.: UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER (Boston), Oct. 17, 1793, at 1, available at Archive of

Americana, America's Historical Newspapers, 1690-1876 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.) ("'It is true,
sir, that the words of the preamble recognize the power and authority of the people, but they
also confirm the existence and independence of the States-for it is not the people generally,
but the people of the United States, which are described in that very preamble, as the author of
the Constitution . . . .'" (quoting Dr. Jarvis during debate in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives)); see alsoAmar,supra note 24, at 1450.
107. Although some Anti-Federalists complained that the Tenth Amendment's reference to
"the people" might be read as consolidating the nation into a single unitary mass, Federalists
denied the claim and moderates had no difficulty in reading the clause as reserving nondelegated power to the people of the individual states. CompareLetter from Richard Henry Lee
to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 71, at 295-96
(complaining about the language of the Tenth Amendment), with Letter from Edmund
Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5 DOcUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 223 ("The twelfth [Tenth] amendment does not appear to me
to have any real effect, unless it be to excite a dispute between the United States, and every
particular state, as to what is delegated. It accords pretty nearly with what our convention
proposed.").
108. For example, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland,
stated:
The government of the Union, then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on
the case), is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in
substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404-05 (1819); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
304, 324 (1816) ("The constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by
the states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution
declares, by 'the people of the United States.'"); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION § 417, at 400 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (citing the nationalist
depictions of the people in Martin and McCulloch).
109. For a discussion of Tucker's federalist vision of the Constitution and Justice Story's
rejection of the same, see generally Kurt T. Lash, "Tucker's Rule": St. George Tucker and the Limited
Constructionof FederalPower, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2006).
110. McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316.
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nationalist vision of the Constitution that scandalized compact theorists who
continued to read "the People" as a reference to the many people in the
several states.' Not surprisingly, when the Confederate states seceded from
language that removed the ambiguity of the
the Union, they adopted
14
original Constitution.
But these debates remained for the future. The immediate issue is
whether it was possible that, in 1791, the ratifiers understood the Ninth
Amendment as retaining unenumerated rights to the collective control of
the people in the several states. In light of the common usage of terms like
"retained rights" and "the people," the answer is yes. Resolving whether they
did requires a continued investigation of the historical evidence.
D. THE

VIRGINIA RESPONSE TO THE FINAL DRAFT

The decision to remove Madison's language addressing the implied
enlargement of federal power may have streamlined the Ninth Amendment,
but it resulted in a text unlike any suggested by the state ratifying
conventions. In theory, the Amendment limited federal power, but it did so
only by implication, not express declaration. Nevertheless, the language
satisfied most of the state legislative assemblies, who quickly ratified the
Ninth Amendment along with most of the other proposed amendments. In
Virginia, however, the changed language of the Ninth Amendment caused
such concern that it delayed that state's ratification of the Bill of Rights for
two years.

Cohensv. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
See generally Spender Roane, Roane's "Hampden" Essays, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S
DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
114.
See CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA art. VI, § 5 (1861) ("The
enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people of the several States."); id. art. VI, § 6 ("The powers not delegated
to the Confederate States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States, respectively, or to the people thereof."). Barnett concedes that it is logically possible
that the additional words in the Confederate Constitution reflect an intent to restore the
original meaning of the amendments. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 80. He
claims, however, that there is no evidence that this is the case and that if my assertion about the
original and continued understanding of the Ninth Amendment were correct, there would
have been no reason to add the additional words. See id. at 79-80.
As my article, The LostJurtisprudenceof the Ninth Amendment, makes clear, however, the
Marshall Court ignored the Ninth Amendment and insisted that the "people" of the Tenth
Amendment were the undifferentiated people of the United States. See Lash, The Lost
Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 606. Every court and commentator who discussed or applied the
Ninth Amendment during this period rejected this "consolidationist" reading. See id. at 642. By
focusing only on the founding and dismissing the relevance of evidence in the antebellum
period, Barnett misses this debate and thus misses the reason why the Confederate states would
feel the need to clarify what they believed was the correct original meaning of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments.
111.
112.
113.
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Although Anti-Federalist sentiment ran high in Virginia, a majority of
the state convention had ratified the Constitution on the understanding that
amendments limiting the scope of federal power would be forthcoming.
Furthermore, adding a bill of rights not only would deliver on a promise
Madison made to the state convention, it also would rob the Anti-Federalists
of their cause cdlbre and deflate the calls for a second constitutional
convention.' 15 Thus, it was a matter of immediate concern to Madison when
he heard that efforts to ratify the Bill of Rights in Virginia had been brought
to a halt by a "friend of the Constitution," Edmund Randolph, due to his
concerns about Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
1.

The Concerns of Edmund Randolph

As a member of the Philadelphia Convention, Edmund Randolph had
refused to sign the proposed Constitution.' 6 He did not oppose the idea of
a national government, but he believed that provisions like the Necessary
and Proper Clause opened the door to unconstrained federal power.
According to Randolph: "My objection is, that the [Necessary and Proper
Clause] is ambiguous, and that that ambiguity may injure the states. My fear
is, that it will, by gradual accessions, gather to a dangerous length. This is my
apprehension, and I disdain to disown it."1 7 Despite his doubts, Randolph
nevertheless supported the Constitution, trusting that federal power could
be constrained through the adoption of appropriate amendments. As
Madison wrote to Jefferson in December of 1787, men like Edmund
Randolph "do not object to the substance of the Governt. [government] but
contend for a few additional guards in favor of the Rights of the States and
of the people." 1 8 It would soon be clear that Randolph's concerns involved
the "people" of the several states.
Madison helped to secure Virginia's ratification by assuring doubters
like Edmund Randolph that he would support a Bill of Rights." 9 Both
Madison and Randolph had helped draft the Virginia Convention's
proposed amendments, including the Seventeenth proposal that Madison
substantially copied in his original draft of the Ninth Amendment.
20
Madison's proposed amendments were published in local newspapers,1
115. See Kurt T. Lash, Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: FederalistAmbivalence in the Framingand
Implementation of Article V,38 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 221 (1994).
116. See LEVY, supra note 58, at 104.
117. Remarks of Edmund Randolph, Debates in the Convention of the State of Virginia
(June 15, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 470.
118. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787), in 5 WRITINGS OF
MADISON, supra note 28, at 65.
119. Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT.
REv. 301, 325; Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 10, 1788), in 5 WRITINGS
OF MADISON, supranote 28, at 117-20.
120. See, e.g.,
Amendments to the New Constitution, Proposed by the Hon. Mr. Madison, GAZETTE
U.S. (New York), June 13, 1789, at 71, available at Archive of Americana, America's Historical
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and he sent a copy directly to Edmund Randolph.12 ' No one in Virginia,
including Randolph, voiced any complaint about Madison's original draft of
proposed amendments. Indeed, upon receiving Madison's proposals,
Randolph wrote, "The amendments proposed by you,
are much approved by
122
the strong foederalists here and at the metropolis."
Toward the end of the summer of 1789, Congress submitted to the
states the final form of twelve proposed amendments. The altered language
of the final draft of the Ninth Amendment (eleventh on a list of twelve
proposed amendments)1 23 now caused Randolph grave concern. As Hardin
Burley, a member of the Virginia House, reported to Madison:
On the two last [the Ninth and Tenth Amendments] a debate of
some lenght [sic] took place, which ended in rejection. Mr. E.
Randolph who advocated all the other[] [amendments] stood in
this contest in the front of opposition. His principal objection was
pointed against the word retained in the eleventh proposed
amendment, and his argument if I understood it was applied in this
manner, that as the rights declared in the first ten of the proposed
amendments were not all that a free people would require the
exercise of; and that as there was no criterion by which it could be
determined whither any other particular right was retained or not,
it would be more safe, & more consistent with the spirit of the 1st &
17th amendments proposed by Virginia, that this reservation
against constructive power, should operate rather as a provision
against extending the powers of Congress by their own authority,
than as a protection to rights reducible to no definitive certainty."'
According to Burnley, Randolph understood the Ninth Amendment
was meant to be a "reservation against constructive power" (as opposed to a
guardian of natural rights). As such, it would have been more consistent
with the "spirit" of Virginia's First and Seventeenth proposed amendments
to use language expressly addressing the issue of extended federal power. In
his letters to George Washington, Edmund Randolph elaborated on his

Newspapers, 1690-1876 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.); Congressional Intelligence: House of
Representatives, DAILY ADVERTISER (New York), June 12, 1789, at 2, available at Archive of
Americana, America's Historical Newspapers, 1690-1876 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.).
121. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 219 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter PAPERS OF MADISON].
122. Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (June 30, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF
MADISON, supra note 121, at 273. Randolph wrote to Madison again on July 19, 1789, and,
again, said nothing about the Bill of Rights in general or the Ninth Amendment in particular.
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (July 19, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 121, at 298-300.
123. 1 JOURNAL OFITHE SENATE 97 (Joseph Gales ed., 1820).
124. Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 219.
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objections. Although he did not think that the Tenth Amendment was
particularly troublesome, Randolph nevertheless viewed the Amendment by
itself to be an inadequate limitation on federal power:
The [Tenth] amendment does not appear to me to have any real
effect, unless it be to excite a dispute between the United States,
and every particular state, as to what is delegated. It accords pretty
nearly with what our convention proposed; but being once
adopted, it5 may produce new matter for the cavils of the
2
designing.
Randolph's more serious concerns involved the Ninth Amendment. The
final draft of that provision, Randolph complained to Washington, "is
exceptionable to me, in giving a handle to say, that congress have
endeavoured to administer an opiate, by an alteration, which is merely
plausible." 26 Instead of this merely "plausible alteration,"
Randolph
t,,I127
preferred "a provision against extending the powers of Congress.
Such an
express limitation on the implied enlargement of federal power would be
"more safe, & more consistent with the spirit of [Virginia's] 1st & 17th,
128
amendments."'
Randolph was deeply concerned about the federal government
stretching its powers to the injury of the states. This is why he originally
refused to sign the proposed Constitution. The First and Seventeenth
proposals of the Virginia convention sought to avoid such injury and did so
by directly addressing the issue of federal power. Although Madison's
original draft of the Ninth Amendment expressly addressed this concern,
the final draft did not. To Edmund Randolph, this was a problem precisely
because it only plausibly limited federal power. This left the door open to
Anti-Federalist complaints of unconstrained federal power and the
continued calls for a second national convention. Accordingly, Randolph
advised rejecting both the proposed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in
order to maintain pressure on Congress to produce a more "federalist"
amendment. As he wrote to Washington:
I confess, that I see no propriety in adopting ... [the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments]. But I trust that the refusal to ratify will open
the road to such an expression of foederalism, as will efface the

125.

Letter from Edmund Randolph

to George Washington

(Dec. 6, 1789), in 5

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 223. Notice that Randolph has

no objection to the addition of the words "or to the people" in the final draft of the Tenth
Amendment. It was only the hyper (and strategically) sensitive Anti-Federalists who saw this
addition as posing any danger to the states.
126. Id.
127. Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORYOF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 219.

128.

Id.
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violence of the last year, and the intemperance of the enclosed
letter, printed
by the enemies to the constitution, without
129
authority.

In sum, Randolph believed the Ninth Amendment was meant to
prevent the implied enlargement of federal power to the injury of the states.
This was the purpose of Virginia's First and Seventeenth proposed
amendments, and this had been expressly stated in Madison's original drafts
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The final draft of the Tenth
Amendment was fine, but inadequate-an additional rule limiting the
construction of enumerated federal power was required. The final draft of
the Ninth Amendment plausibly accomplished this goal, but it would have
been better to use the clearer language of Virginia's original proposals.
Randolph was so concerned about the final draft that he was temporarily
willing to hold up ratification of the Bill of Rights in the hopes of obtaining
a clearer, more "foederal" draft of the Ninth Amendment.
2.

The Letters of Hardin Burnley and James Madison

When Madison heard about Randolph's actions in the Virginia House,
he was mystified. Although the final language of the Ninth Amendment had
been altered, it continued to advance the principles as Virginia's
Seventeenth. Madison immediately reported to George Washington:
The difficulty started agst. [against] the amendments is really
unlucky, and the more to be regretted as it springs from a friend to
the Constitution. It is a still greater cause of regret, if the
distinction be, as it appears to me, altogether fanciful. If a line can
be drawn between the powers granted and the rights retained, it
would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter be secured by
declaring that they0 shall not be abridged, or that the former shall
13
not be extended.

Randolph thought the Ninth Amendment was insufficiently "federalist"
because it used the language of rights instead of the language of limited
power (as had Virginia's Seventeenth). Madison, however, believed that
Randolph's distinction between rights and powers was "fanciful." If the goal
is to establish a line between delegated power and retained rights, then
limiting power or retaining rights amount to the same thing. Accordingly,
Randolph was wrong to complain about the altered language of the Ninth
Amendment-the final draft remained just as "federalist" as the original.
129.

Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Nov. 26, 1789), in 5

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 216.

130. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 221-22. Randy Barnett rejects this rightspowers distinction as out of sync with modern understanding of personal rights. BARNETT, supra
note 1, at 3. Madison, it appears, had a different point of view.
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Professor Barnett believes that Madison's letter to Washington exhibits
"Madison's typically complex phraseology," 13 1 and actually refers to two
different means of accomplishing the single end of preserving individual
natural rights. Madison's letter, however, is neither complex nor has
anything to do with preserving individual natural rights. Barnett misses this
point by failing to consider the subject matter of Madison's letter-the
concerns of Edmund Randolph. Those concerns were about state rights and
not retained individual natural rights. Madison believed Randolph's
concerns were "fanciful" because he read the final language of the Ninth
Amendment as meeting Randolph's federalism-based concerns. Hardin
Burnley agreed with Madison about the Ninth Amendment's protection of
state rights and said so in a letter (which Madison passed on to Washington)
that makes this point as clear as humanly possible:
But others among whom I am one see not the force of
[Randolph's] distinction, for by preventing an extension of power
in that body from which danger is apprehended safety will be
insured if its powers are not too extensive already, & so by
protecting the rights of the people & of the States, an improper
of power will be prevented & safety made equally
extension
I 2
certain. 1

Here Burnley-a ratifier in the Virginia Assembly-expressly describes the
Ninth Amendment as protecting the rights of the states. Indeed, if Madison
and Burnley were not talking about how the Ninth Amendment guards state
autonomy, then their entire exchange becomes nonsensical (it would mean,
for one thing, that Randolph was right to delay ratification). Professor
Barnett nevertheless maintains that Madison was speaking about individual
rights and dismisses Burnley's comment about states' rights because
"Burnley himself clearly distinguishes between 'the people' and 'the states'3
and the actual words of the Ninth Amendment refer only to the former."0
This, of course, begs the very question under discussion-whether the
ratifiers understood the retained rights of the Ninth Amendment to include
"state rights." Burnley obviously thought it did.
Most significantly, Barnett's dismissive treatment of Burnley's statement
misses the point of Madison's and Burnley's letters: both men believed that
Randolph had wrongly criticized the Ninth Amendment as inadequately
"federalist." Preserving the retained rights of the people would necessarily
constrain federal power and adequately protect the retained rights of the

131.
132.

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 54.
Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supranote 51, at 219 (emphasis added).

133.

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 55.
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people and the states. 34 This is the only way to make sense of both Burnley's
and Madison's responses to Randolph's concerns. Keeping the letter's
subject in view has the happy effect of rendering Madison's prose quite
clear: preventing an extension of power and retaining rights amount to the
same thing. i 5
3.

The Virginia Senate Report

Given that they were in constant touch throughout this period, we can
assume that Madison promptly communicated his assurances regarding the
Ninth Amendment to Randolph. 3 6 In any event, we know that Randolph
137
quickly abandoned his opposition to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Unfortunately, the damage was done. Anti-Federalists managed to exploit
the delay and put off a final vote on ratifying the Bill of Rights. l13 Although
the House voted in support of the amendments, ratification ran into trouble
in the Anti-Federalist-dominated Senate where Randolph's original concerns
were "revived. " 13 9 The Senate majority resisted ratification and produced a
Report repeating Randolph's concerns and adding a few of their own. 4 In
brief, the Senate amplified Randolph's concerns and expanded them to
include criticism of the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.'
The complaints of the Senate majority have to be taken with more than
a grain of salt: the Anti-Federalists wanted to derail ratification of the Bill of
Rights in order to maintain the pressure for a second constitutional
convention. 4 2 They had every reason to exaggerate their concerns about the
134. Id. at 54-55. Although Burnley distinguished the rights of the people from the rights
of the States, the critical point is that he believed the Ninth Amendment protected both.
Burnley's distinction is perfectly in line with a pro-state autonomy reading of the Ninth
Amendment once one realizes that the Tenth Amendment makes the same distinction.
135. To date, Professor Barnett has never addressed the actual subject of Burnley and
Madison's correspondence-the concerns of Edmund Randolph.
136. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 7, 1787), in 5 WRITINGS OF
MADISON, supra note 28, at 8-9; Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 21,
1787), in 5 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 28, at 15-17; Letter from James Madison to
Edmund Randolph (Nov. 18, 1787), in 5 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 28, at 56-58.
137. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 15, 1789), in 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supranote 51, at 225-27.

138. See Letter from Ed. Carrington to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 227-30.
139. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Jan. 4, 1790), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 231.
140. I have written elsewhere in detail about the debate in the Virginia legislature. See Lash,
The Lost Original Meaning, supra note 1, at 371. Prior to my original article on the Ninth
Amendment, this first public debate regarding the meaning of the Ninth Amendment had
gone unnoticed.
141. See LEVY, supra note 58, at 42 (discussing the Anti-Federalist opposition to the Bill of
Rights in the Virginia Senate).
142. For a general discussion over the struggles for and against a second convention, see
Lash, supranote 115.
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proposed amendments.
Nevertheless, even the exaggerated claims and
concerns of the Virginia Senate majority can shed some light on the original
meaning (or ambiguity) of the Ninth Amendment.
In its Report, the Virginia Senate objected that the Ninth Amendment
had not been "asked for by Virginia or any other State" and that "it appears
to us highly exceptionable."'4
If

. .

. [the Ninth Amendment,] is meant to guard against the

extension of the powers of Congress by implication, it is greatly
defective, and does by no means comprehend the idea expressed
in the 17th article of amendments proposed by Virginia; and as it
respects personal rights, might be dangerous, because, should the
rights of the people be invaded or called in question, they might be
required to shew by the constitution what rights they have retained;
and such as could not from that instrument be proved to be
retained by them, they might be denied to possess. Of this there is
ground to be apprehensive, when Congress are already seen
denying certain rights of the people, heretofore deemed clear and
unquestionable. 45
The Report seems to suggest that there are two possible readings of the
Ninth Amendment. If this was an attempt to address the concerns of
Virginia's Seventeenth proposal, it was "greatly defective." If, on the other
hand, this was an attempt to secure the people's retained rights, then it was
ineffective (and might be "dangerous"). Barnett reads these alternate
143. Leonard Levy describes the Senate Report as "grossly misrepresenting the First
Amendment (then the third)." LEW, supranote 58, at 42. Madison himself was not troubled by

the Senate Report because he believed the Senate had gone too far, particularly in regard to
the Senate's purported objections to the First Amendment, which it listed as the third. See
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Jan. 4, 1790), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 231 (expressing his opinion that the Senate's failure to
ratify "will have the effect with many of turning their distrust towards their own Legislature" and

noting that the "miscarriage of the 3d. art. particularly, will have this effect").
144.

Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF

VIRGINIA 63 (Richmond, Thomas W. White 1828).
145. Id. at 63-64. The Senate's reported objections to the Tenth Amendment were as
follows:
We conceive that [the Tenth Amendment] would come up to the 1st article of the
Virginia amendments, were it not for the words "or to the people." It is not
declared to be the people of the respective States; but the expression applies to the
people generally as citizens of the United States, and leaves it doubtful what
powers are reserved to the State Legislatures. Unrestrained by the constitution or
these amendments, Congress might, as the supreme rulers of the people, assume
those powers which properly belong to the respective States, and thus gradually
effect an entire consolidation.
Id. at 64. This exaggerated concern about the Tenth Amendment does not appear to have been

shared by anyone other than those seeking to force a second constitutional convention. See
supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
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complaints and concludes that the Senate Report establishes that the final
version of the Ninth "represented a change in its public meaning from the
protection of state powers to the protection of 'personal rights.' 146 The
Report, however, actually presents two possible meanings both in line with
the state's concerns: one inadequate, the other ineffective.
Taking the latter first, the Senate majority complained that, if this was
an attempt to secure retained personal rights, then it was ineffective because
the plaintiff in such a case would be unable to establish the existence of such
a right from the text of the Constitution. 147 As explained above, even if the
Senate is only referring to individual natural rights (and there is no reason to
think that the Anti-Federalist Senate would be concerned solely with retained
individual natural rights), then these rights would be retained to the people
of the individual states. If Barnett is trying to argue that the Anti-Federalistdominated Senate understood retained rights in a manner that would not
leave all such rights under state control, he simply does not understand antifederalism.
But even if one concedes (which I do not) that the Senate's second
concern is a reference only to retained individual rights, the Senate majority
expressly notes that this is only one of two possible meanings. The first
possible meaning suggested by the Senate is an attempt to address the same
concerns as those addressed by Virginia's Seventeenth proposal. The Senate
argued that if this was the intended meaning of the Ninth Amendment, then
it inadequately addressed those particular concerns.
The Senate's language here is an exaggerated restatement of
Randolph's
preference for the language of Virginia's Seventeenth
•148
proposal.
The entire Senate Report, in fact, was given to exaggeration.
Among other things, the Report argued that the proposed Free Exercise
Clause "does not prohibit the rights of conscience from being violated or
infringed," and the Establishment Clause allows Congress "to levy taxes, to
any amount, for the support of religion or its preachers; and any particular
denomination of Christians might be so favored and supported by the
General Government, as to give it a decided advantage over others." 149 The
Report also claimed that the Free Speech and Press Clauses did not "declare

146. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supranote 8, at 51.
147. This probably echoes a concern originally voiced by Randolph in the House. Burnley's
letter to Madison collapses this argument with Randolph's second and independent complaint
that the best approach to limit power was to use the language of Virginia's Seventeenth
proposal. Even Burnley was not sure that he had adequately presented Randolph's concerns. See
Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 219 (indicating that Burnley may not have understood the
precise nature of Randolph's objection).
148. See supra note 122 and accompany text.
149. Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA 62 (Richmond, Va., Thomas W. White 1828).
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and assert the right of the people to speak and publish their sentiments."5 '
It is difficult to take these criticisms seriously-much less at face value.
According to Leonard Levy, the Senate Report "grossly misrepresented" the
First Amendment, and Madison himself believed that the Senate had
overplayed its hand and that its Report would backfire. 15 1 In fact, Virginia's
Anti-Federalist effort to derail the Bill of Rights ultimately failed.
On the other hand, despite the obviously exaggerated rhetoric, the
Senate Report does represent possible readings of the Ninth Amendment.
Even if the Senate had an incentive to exaggerate, they did not intend their
arguments to stray so far from reason as to discredit their position (though
this may have happened anyway). Therefore, I agree with Professor Barnett
that scholars should grant at least some plausibility to the complaints of the
Senate majority, given the senators' goal of winning over a sufficient number
of moderates to derail the ratification of the Bill of Rights. For example, the
Senate correctly pointed out that the final language of the Ninth
Amendment did not track the language of any proposal submitted by the
state conventions. This left the Senate in the position of guessing at the
purpose of the altered language. The fact that the Senate could not decide
on the precise object of the Ninth Amendment raises the possibility that the
final version of the Ninth Amendment is hopelessly ambiguous. It might be
an attempt to preserve the autonomy of the states, but then again, it might
not. Given the reaction of the Senate majority, perhaps the final language of
the Ninth Amendment was so unclear as to render the Amendment without
any commonly accepted public meaning.
However, before abandoning the originalist effort altogether, some
facts must be kept in mind. To begin with, no other state legislature
complained about the final language of the Ninth Amendment. All of these
states knew that Madison's original version of the Ninth Amendment
expressly limited federal power. 52 Only in Virginia did the legislators raise
concerns about the final version of the Ninth Amendment. Also, we know
that Virginians, like Madison and Burnley, believed that the final version
guarded the same principles as those expressed in Virginia's Seventeenth
(thus, the unreasonableness of Randolph's complaint). If others shared this
reading of the Ninth Amendment, this would explain the general lack of
concern by moderates and proponents of the Bill of Rights. We also know
that despite his concerns, Randolph believed the federalist reading was a
"plausible" one, and he soon abandoned his opposition. Finally, we know
that the Senate majority had every reason to exaggerate concerns about the

150. Id.
151. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
152. Madison's proposals had been widely published in newspapers across the country. See
supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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Ninth Amendment, and we know that their efforts to prevent ratification
failed.
In sum, there is no good reason to believe that one part of the Senate
Report's complaint about the Ninth Amendment represented the common
public understanding of the Clause. In fact, there is good historical reason
not to do so. Nevertheless, given that moderates like Edmund Randolph
were initially thrown by the final language of the Ninth Amendment, one
cannot completely dismiss their complaint. Even if the language of the
Ninth Amendment satisfied other states, Virginia remained temporarily
undecided about the Ninth Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights.
Legislators needed to address the ambiguous nature of the Ninth
Amendment, if only to satisfy Virginia moderates.
...

enterJames Madison.

E.

MADISON'S SPEECHON THE BANK OFTHE UNITED STATES

Perhaps the most important source of historical evidence regarding the
public understanding of the Ninth Amendment is Madison's speech
opposing the First Bank of the United States. Delivered by the person who
drafted the Ninth Amendment, the speech includes both an explanation
and an application of the Ninth Amendment, and he delivered it while
Virginia remained undecided about the Ninth Amendment and the rest of
the Bill of Rights. To put the speech in perspective, no other provision in
the Bill of Rights received anything near this kind of public discussion and
application at the very time its ratification was under consideration.
One of the most important aspects of Madison's speech on the Bank of
the United States is that it establishes Madison's view that the Ninth
Amendment was meant to limit unduly broad interpretations of federal
power. On this point, Barnett and I agree. Madison understood the Ninth
Amendment as more than a mere passive statement of principle. He read
the Amendment as a judicially enforceable rule of construction-an active
constraint on federal power. Where Barnett and I disagree involves whether
Madison's use of the Ninth Amendment involved the protection of an
individual natural right or the preservation of state autonomy. Elsewhere, I
have argued in detail that Madison used the Ninth Amendment in defense
of state rights and did so in a manner that recapitulates the entire history of
the Amendment, from its roots in the state conventions to its final
placement alongside, and in tandem with, the Tenth Amendment. 5 3 What
follows is more of a summary of that argument than a complete analysis of
the speech, concentrating on those aspects that are particularly relevant to
my disagreement with Professor Barnett.
Madison delivered his speech early in 1791 while the Bill of Rights
remained pending in Virginia. The speech involved one of the first debates
153.

See Lash, The Lost OriginalMeaning, supranote 1, at 384-92.
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over the interpretation of federal power, in this case, whether the
enumerated powers of Congress included the power to incorporate a
national bank. Nationalists, like Alexander Hamilton, argued for a broad
reading of federal power, particularly in regard to the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 154 James Madison, however, believed such broad readings of federal
power betrayed the assurances Federalists made to the state conventions in
their attempt to win support for the Constitution.
Madison delivered his major argument in a speech before the House of
Representatives on February 2, 1791.155 After some brief remarks regarding
the merits of incorporating a bank, Madison presented an extended
argument regarding the constitutionality of the Bank. He begins this section
by laying out the proper rules of constitutional interpretation:
[1] An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the
Government cannot be just....
[2] In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the
instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper
guide.
[3] Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable
evidence of the meaning of the parties.
[4] In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the
degree of its incidentality to an express authority is to be regarded,
the
but the degree of its importance also; since on this will depend
56
probability or improbability of its being left to construction.1
Madison developed and applied these rules in the main body of his
speech. As Madison made clear in the next section of his remarks,
preserving the "characteristic of the Government" under Rule [1] involved
the reserved autonomy of the states. The "parties" referenced in Rule [2],
whose understandings are a proper guide to constitutional interpretation,
are the state ratifying conventions. The promises made to those conventions
about the limited nature of federal power are the "expositions" of Rule [3].
Finally, Rule [4] is an interpretive rule that Madison derives from the
Constitution itself: the more important the power, the more likely the
parties would have expressly listed it in the text rather than leave such an
important matter to implication.
After laying out the appropriate approach to interpreting the
Constitution, Madison then addressed the specific arguments in support of
154. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Final Version of the Second Report on the FurtherProvision Necessary
for EstablishingPublic Credit, in 7 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 305-42 (Harold C. Syrett
ed., 1963).
155. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
156. Id.
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congressional power. For instance, if the power to incorporate a bank were
located in the General Welfare Clause it "would render nugatory the
enumeration of particular powers; would supersede all the powers reserved
to the State Governments." 157 In response to those who argued that Congress
could act for the "general welfare" so long as it did not interfere with the
powers of the states, Madison argued that chartering a bank "would directly
interfere with the rights of the States, to prohibit as well as to establish
, 5

Banks."'1

Addressing the Necessary and Proper Clause, Madison argued that
deriving the power to charter a bank as necessary and proper to borrowing
money opened the door to an unlimited list of implied powers and required
a "latitude of interpretation .

.

. condemned by the rule furnished by the

Constitution itself." 59 Madison believed that the manner in which the
Founders enumerated powers in the Constitution established an implicit
"rule" requiring the express enumeration of all "great and important
power [s] .0160 Declaring that "[i] t cannot be denied that the power proposed
to be exercised is an important power,"' 61 Madison then listed a number of
significant aspects of the Bank Charter, including the fact that the "bill gives
a power to purchase and hold lands" and that "[i] t involves a monopoly,
To Madison, these effects
which affects the equal rights of every citizen.
was
a "great and important
established that the power to charter a bank
63
power" that required express enumeration.
In the final section of his speech, Madison addressed the original
understanding of federal power represented to the conventions that ratified
the document. In one of the first constitutional arguments based on original

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1947-48, 1949.
160. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) ("The
examples cited, with others that might be added, sufficiently inculcate, nevertheless, a rule of
interpretation, very different from that on which the bill rests. They condemn the exercise of
any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not evidently and necessarily
involved in an express power."); see also id. at 2009 (observing during the debates over the Bank
Bill that "[t] he power of granting Charters ... is a great and important power, and ought not to
be exercised unless without we find ourselves expressly authorized to grant them").
161. Id. at 1949.
162. Id. at 1950.
163. Id. at 1949. Madison stated:
From this view of the power of incorporation exercised in the bill, it could never

be deemed an accessory or subaltern power, to be deduced by implication, as a
means of executing another power; it was in its nature a distinct, an independent
and substantive prerogative, which not being enumerated in the Constitution
could never have been meant to be included in it, and not being included, could
never be rightfully exercised.

Id. at 1950.
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understanding, Madison reminded the House that the original objection to
a bill of rights had been due to fear that this would "extend[]" federal power
"by remote implications."' 4 State conventions had been assured that the
Necessary and Proper Clause would not be interpreted to give "additional
powers to those enumerated. ", 165 Madison "read sundry passages from the
debates" of the state conventions in which "the Constitution had been
vindicated by its principal advocates, against a dangerous latitude of its
powers, charged on it by its opponents. ' ,1 66 These state conventions had
agreed to ratify the Constitution only on the condition that certain
explanatory amendments be added that made express what the Federalists
claimed were principles already implicit in the structure of the Constitution.
Madison reminded his audience of the proposals submitted by the state
conventions seeking to guard against the constructive extension of federal
power: "The explanatory declarations and amendments accompanying the
ratifications of the several States formed a striking evidence, wearing the
same complexion. He referred
those who might doubt on the subject, to the
167
several acts of ratification."
Madison then arrives at the argument that he believes concludes the
issue. The proper rule of interpretation-implied in the structure of the
Constitution, represented by the Federalists to the state conventions, and
demanded to be made express by those same conventions-found textual
expression in the proposed Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at
least, would be good authority with them [the state proposals]; all
these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of construction,
excluding the latitude now contended for. These explanations
were the more to be respected, as they had not only been proposed
by Congress, but ratified by nearly three-fourths of the States.l 68 He
read several of the articles proposed, remarking particularly on the
11th and 12th [the 9th and 10th Amendments] the former, as
guarding against a latitude of interpretation; the latter, as
excluding every source of power not within the Constitution
itself. 69
Madison then sums up his argument in a manner that establishes,
without any further question, that he read the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as preserving the autonomy of the states:

164.
165.

Id. at 1951.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).

166.

Id.

167.

Id.

168.

Ratification was still pending in Virginia.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).

169.
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In fine, if the power were in the Constitution, the immediate
exercise of it cannot be essential; if not there, the exercise of it
involves the guilt of usurpation, and establishes a precedent of
interpretation, levelling all the barriers which limit the powers of
the General Government, and protect those of the State
Governments. 7 °
Madison's speech is an extended dissertation on the proper rules of
constitutional interpretation-and how that interpretation ought to be
informed by the expectations of the state conventions. Justifying the Bank
required an unduly broad reading of federal power. The state conventions
had been assured there would be no "latitudinary" readings of federal power;
they had ratified the Constitution with the express understandingthat would
be the case, and they secured amendments ensuring this would not be the
case. The Ninth Amendment expressly prohibited this latitude of
interpretation and, thus, preserved the expected degree of state autonomy.
F

BARNE7T'S INTERPRETATION OF MADISON'S SPEECH

Despite Madison's repeated references to state rights and powers and
his summation linking the Ninth Amendment to the concerns of the state
conventions, Professor Barnett nevertheless argues that Madison's speech
establishes that "Madison viewed the Ninth Amendment as providing
authority for a rule against a loose construction of [federal] powersespecially the Necessary and Proper Clause-when legislation affected the
rights retained by the people."' 7 ' To Barnett, the Bank speech supports his
conclusion "that the unenumerated individual rights retained by the people
provide the same sort of check on latitudinarian constructions of federal
power as do the enumerated rights.""' 2 The problem with this reading of
Madison's speech is that Madison nowhere claims that the Bank Bill violates
"unenumerated individual rights." Indeed, Madison never even mentions
the "rights retained by the people." Instead, Madison repeatedly asserts that
the Bill violates states' rights. Barnett's claim to the contrary is based on a
single reference by Madison to a monopoly's effect on "the equal rights of
every citizen."'73
I want to do full justice to Barnett's argument because of his repeated
reliance on it in later works and the critical role it plays in his overall theory
of a libertarian Ninth Amendment: this is Barnett's only piece of historical
evidence in which (he believes) the Ninth is described as a libertarian

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supranote 8, at 56.
Id.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
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guardian of individual rights. 7 4 Barnett's argument is not presented in his
recent article 175 but can be found in his earlier work. 176 Here it is in full:
In evaluating whether the necessary and proper clause justified the
claimed power to create a national bank, Madison contrasted the
requirement of necessity with that of mere convenience or
expediency. "But the proposed bank," he said:
"could not even be called necessary to the Government;
at
most it could be but convenient. Its uses to the Government
could be supplied by keeping the taxes a little in advance; by
loans from individuals; by the other Banks, over which the
Government would have equal command; nay greater, as it
might grant or refuse to these the privilege (a free and
irrevocable gift to the proposed Bank) of using their notes in
the Federal revenues."
Notice that Madison was not simply making what would now be
called a "policy" choice. Earlier in his address to the House,
Madison did address the policy issues raised by the proposal when
he "began with a general review of the advantages and
disadvantages of Banks." However, "[i] n making these remarks on
the merits of the bill, he had reserved to himself the right to deny
the authority of Congress to pass it." Rather, in the passage I
quoted, Madison is making the constitutional argument that these
other means of accomplishing an enumerated object or end are
superior precisely because they did not entail the violation of the
rights retained by the people and are therefore to be preferred in
principle. In particular, these measures do not involve the grant of
a monopoly, "which,"
in Madison's words, "affects the equal rights of
77
every citizen." 1

This is a clearly erroneous reading of Madison's speech. Madison's
reference to equal rights has nothing to do with his statement regarding the
Bank's "necessity." Nor is Madison making a point about retained individual
rights. Barnett has collapsed two entirely separate arguments and reversed
the order in which they appear. Just to let Madison's own words be our
guide, here is his reference to "equal rights" in context:

174. In his early work, Barnett appeared to claim that Sherman's Draft Bill of Rights also
linked the Ninth Amendment to retained individual natural rights. He seems to have since
backed away from that claim.
175. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8.
176. See Barnett, Implementing the Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 15.
177. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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It cannot be denied that the power proposed to be exercised is an
important power....
In the power to make by-laws, the bill delegated a sort of legislative
power, which is unquestionably an act of a high and important
nature....
It takes from our successors, who have equal rights with ourselves,
and with the aid of experience will be more capable of deciding on
the subject, an opportunity of exercising that right for an
immoderate term....
It involves a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every
citizen.
It leads to a penal regulation, perhaps capital punishments, one of
the most solemn acts of sovereign authority.
From this view of the power of incorporation exercised in the bill,
it could never be deemed an accessory or subaltern power, to be
deduced by implication, as a means of executing another power; it
was in its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive
prerogative, which not being enumerated in the Constitution,
could never have been meant to be included
S.178 in it, and not being
included, could never be rightfully exercised.
Madison's argument about the Bank's effect on "equal rights" was part
of a larger argument regarding the importance of the power at issue. The
Bank's effect on equal rights was one among a number of listed "effects" that
marked it as an important power requiring enumeration.
Madison next argued that enumeration was required even if the power
was believed "necessary" to the proper operation of the national
government. Madison pointed out that people had not always appreciated
the difference "between a power necessary and proper for the Government
or Union, and a power necessary and proper for executing the enumerated
powers."' 79 Just because a power was deemed "necessary" did not bring it
within reach of the "necessary and proper clause." For example, "[h]ad the
power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it
might have been, the defect could only have been lamented, or supplied by
an amendment of the Constitution." 8 0 It is only at this point that Madison
goes further and claims, "[b] ut the proposed Bank could not even be called
necessary to the Government," and he then lists the various alternate means

178.
179.
180.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949-50 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
Id. at 1950.
Id.
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available to Congress quoted by Randy Barnett.'"' At this point, Madison is
making a new and separate argument that there also is no necessity of
adding the power of chartering banks to the Constitution.
I discussed this passage and Professor Barnett's error in a previous
article. l' ' In his recent response, Barnett addresses a secondary argument
based on Madison's draft veto and objects to my placing the "equal rights"
argument in Madison's merits-based objections instead of placing it in his
constitutional objections. 8 1 I now think Barnett is right-the equal-rights
argument is within Madison's section on constitutional objections. However,
Barnett never addresses my primary criticism of his claim about Madison's
reference to equal rights. Yes, it was a constitutional argument, but one that
had nothing to do with the Bank Bill violating unenumerated individual
rights, much less individual natural rights. There is neither anything about
individual rights in Madison's summation nor is there any mention of
individual rights in his draft veto of the Bank Bill. m84 What we do find, on the
other hand, are repeated express claims that the Bill violates the retained

rights of the states.185
Faced with Madison's references expressly linking the Ninth
Amendment to state rights, Barnett makes the same move as he did when
faced with Burnley's express statement that the Ninth Amendment
protected states' rights-he dismisses the references as "mistakes":
[W]e ought not make too much of Madison's two uses of the word
"rights" when referring to the powers of the states. The
Constitution is far more scrupulous about using the terms "rights"
only when speaking of the people or citizens or persons, and
"powers" when speaking of either the government or the people. In
so
punctilious.
were
not
discourse,
speakers
everyday
refers
to the
Overwhelmingly, however, in his speech I Madison
6
1
powers of states, rather than to their rights.
This is a surprising statement coming from someone supposedly
committed to the search for original meaning. Because the text is not selfexplanatory, originalists search for original meaning in public debates and
common contemporary usages of phrases and terms. Put another way,
originalists use "everyday discourse" to help them understand a text; they do

181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. See Lash, The Lost OriginalMeaning, supra note 1, at 384-93.
183. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 58-59.
184. James Madison, Draft Veto Message Regarding the Bank Bill for George Washington
(Feb. 21, 1971), in 6 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supranote 28, at 42-43.
185. Although Barnett cites other speakers who complained that the Bank Bill established a

monopoly, none of these speakers made any reference to the Ninth Amendment or to a
violation of retained individual rights. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supranote 8, at 59.
186. Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
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not use assumed meanings of the text to dismiss common contemporary
usage. Barnett's approach flips the originalist inquiry on its head and judges
common usage according to his assumed interpretation of the text. In the
end, Barnett simply begs the question when he assumes that Madison must
have been referring to state powers when he (repeatedly) referred to state
rights. We cannot know this without consulting common usage-the very
evidence Barnett dismisses.
Madison's complaints about the Bank Bill violating state rights were not
unique. Newspapers echoed Madison's concern that the proposed bank
violated the retained rights of the states. According to the New York based
The Daily Advertiser
The arguments against establishing the proposed National Bank
acquire new strength by every investigation. It is no less to be
deprecated as unconstitutional, than as founded on an improper
basis. If power had been given to Congress to incorporate great
trading companies, our boasted liberty had been at an end ....
Within the states in which they were established, they might soon
have created powers injurious to its sovereignty, and destructive of
its freedom. But we must be on our guard how we suffer the
doctrine of political expediency or necessity, or plausible
constructions of the constitution,
to be pleaded against manifestly retained
18 7

rights, in the separatestates.

In a state that only a few months earlier had ratified the Ninth
Amendment, these newspaper editors speak of constitutional constructions
that violate retained rights "in the separate states." Their argument in regard to
the Bank echoes Madison's view that the charter required an unduly broad
construction of federal power-one that violated the retained rights of the
states. Decades later, opponents to a renewed Bank charter revived
Madison's arguments against the Bank (newspapers republished his entire
speech), and opponents once again stressed the need to enumerate a great
and important power in order to guard the retained autonomy of the
states.1ss All of these arguments use the language of retained rights in the
service of state sovereignty.

187. Editorial, From the American Daily Advertiser, DAILY ADVERTISER (New York), Feb. 11,
1791, at 2 (emphasis added), available at Archive of Americana, America's Historical
Newspapers, 1690-1876 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.).
188. Although Madison failed to prevent the chartering of the First Bank of the United
States, his Ninth Amendment-based arguments against the Bank would live to fight another day.
When the Bank came up for renewal in 1810, newspapers reprinted Madison's 1791 speech. See,
e.g., The Bank Bill Under Consideration,ENQUIRER (Richmond, Va.), Jan. 4, 1810, at 4, available at
Archive of Americana, America's Historical Newspapers, 1690-1876 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.).
For use of the Ninth Amendment in later congressional debates over renewing the Bank of the
United States, see infra Part V.A.6.
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Although I disagree with Barnett's reading of Madison's speech, I do
not deny that the Ninth Amendment protects individual natural rights, nor
do I insist that the Bank threatened only state rights and not individual
rights. Indeed, some critics contended that monopolies threatened both 8 9
This merely illustrates how the federalist interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment protects all retained rights-natural and positive; individual
and collective; personal and "state." Barnett's error is not his identification
of natural rights as an important subject to the Founders, it is his attempt to
deny Madison's use of the Ninth Amendment as a guardian of state
majoritarian rights and his insistence that the protection of individual rights
was the "single goal" of the Amendment. The evidence suggests that this was
not even the primary goal.
Most critically, Barnett never addresses the penultimate section of
Madison's speech where he expressly links the Ninth Amendment to the
concerns of the state conventions. Here, Madison recapitulates the entire
history of the Ninth Amendment, including the promises made to the state
conventions, the state declarations and proposals, and the final draft that,
according to Madison, prevented a "latitude of interpretation."'90 Madison
then declares in summation that all of his arguments have established how
violating this rule of construction violates the autonomy of the states. This is
the most elaborate discussion of the roots and purposes of the Ninth
Amendment in the historical record, and it establishes that the author
drafted the Ninth Amendment in response to the concerns and demands of
the state conventions. In all of his work on the Ninth Amendment, however,
Barnett never discusses Madison's argument in these critical paragraphs or

189. See House of Representatives of the United States, GEN. ADVERTISER & POL., COM., AGRIc. &
LITERARY J., Feb. 5, 1791, at 3, available at Archive of Americana, America's Historical

Newspapers, 1690-1876 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.) ("[The Bank] interfered with the rights of
private citizens, and in particular with those of state governments."); see alsoJACKSON, supra note
98, at 50 (deriding the Yazoo scandal as involving a monopoly and injuring both individual
equal rights and the collective retained rights of the people of Georgia).
190.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).

Madison stated:
The defense against the charge founded on the want of a bill of rights, presupposed ... that the powers not given were retained; and that those given were
not to be extended by remote implications....
The explanations in the State Conventions all turned on the same fundamental
principle ....
The explanatory declarations and amendments accompanying the ratifications of
the several States formed a striking evidence, wearing the same complexion. ...
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at least, would be
good authority with them; all these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of
construction, excluding the latitude now contended for.
Id. at 1951.
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their implications regarding Madison's (or the public's) understanding of
the Ninth Amendment. 9'
V. POST-ADOPTION COMMENTARY
I have devoted over one-hundred pages in a single law review article to
post-adoption commentary on the Ninth Amendment.192 For the purposes of
this Article, however, it can easily be summarized: the scholarly and judicial
commentary regarding the Ninth Amendment is extensive and uniformly
federalist. Every scholar or judge (state or federal) prior to the Progressive
Era, who discussed or applied the Ninth Amendment, viewed it as a
federalist provision protecting the reserved autonomy of the states. I have
found scattered attempts by lawyers to use an individual-rights reading of the
Ninth Amendment in defense of their clients. This is not surprising given
that the Ninth Amendment protected both individual and collective rights.
What is surprising, however, is the exceeding rarity of these attempts to the
general rule. There are literally hundreds of cases and commentaries linking
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as twin guardians of federalism.
Professor Barnett accuses me of attempting to use these later references as
evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution, and he derides any
attempt to use these "much-later interpretation[s]" as "bootstrapping at
best." 93 Instead, Barnett dismisses nineteenth-century cases and authorities
as tainted by "[t] he rise of the Calhounian states' rights position." 9 4
Professor Barnett is inconsistent in his claims about the value of postadoption testimony. In other works, Barnett consistently relies on95
antebellum sources as evidence to support his claims of original meaning.
In the very same article where Barnett dismisses post-adoption federalist
readings of the Ninth Amendment, he himself relies on Tucker's 1803
Treatise on the Constitution and a variety of antebellum state constitutional
amendments, including some adopted as late as 1857.196 Indeed, Barnett
goes so far as to cite the 1861 Constitution of the Confederate States (so
much for Calhounian-tainted sources!). 97 Although I agree with Barnett

191. Although Barnett quotes some portions of this section of Madison's speech, he limits
his discussion to the description of the Ninth Amendment as preventing a latitude of
interpretation. He never discusses, or even notes, Madison's linking of the Ninth Amendment

to the declarations and demands of the state conventions.
192.
193.

Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence,supra note 1.
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 79 n.336.

194.

Id.

195.
See Barnett, supra note 75, at 246, 249-56, 261, 269.
196. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 75 (citing state constitutional
amendments that adopted the language of the Ninth Amendment).
197. Id. at 79. Barnett also dismisses Justice Joseph Story's discussion of St. George Tucker
in his famous 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution because Justice Story was an "opinionated"
man and because Story wrote his Commentaries "thirty years" after Tucker published his work. Id.
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that the weight of historical evidence tends to lessen as time increases
between it and the adoption of the relevant text, all antebellum commentary
on the Ninth Amendment remains extremely relevant to determine the role
that it played in the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (as my second
article makes clear).198
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Article, I accept Barnett's criteria
and present only pre-Calhounian commentary on the Ninth Amendment. In
fact, I go further than that. The Supreme Court's 1820 opinion in McCulloch
v. Maryland triggered a vociferous defense of state autonomy that only grew
in the years prior to the Civil War. 9 9 Accepting Barnett's premise that this

kind of passion potentially skewed readings of the Ninth Amendment, I
consider only that commentary regarding the Ninth Amendment that
occurred prior to the Court's decision in McCulloch. Even in this limited

period, express references to the Ninth Amendment abound, and they are
uniformly federalist. Some of what follows is discussed in more detail in my
article, The Lost Jurisprudenceof the Ninth Amendment.' °° Most of the evidence
recounted below, however, was uncovered during the preparation of this
Article, and I imagine there is much more to be found.
A.
1.

DISCUSSIONS OF THE NrNTH AMENDAMENT, 1791-1820

The 1796 "Political Catechism" of Elhanan Winchester

In 1796, the Reverend Elhanan Winchester published "A Plain Political
Catechism."20 1 A friend of Declaration of Independence signatory Benjamin
Rush, Reverend Winchester had recently returned to the United States after
having spent seven years successfully preaching in England. Although
Winchester was out of the country during the ratification debates, when he
looked at the words of the Ninth Amendment, he saw the same federalist
principles as James Madison. Here is Winchester's section on the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments:
Question XLI.
What rights and powers remain to the individualstates?

Again, this dismissal of Story's work is hard to understand given that Barnett himself relies on
historical evidence much further removed from the ratification of the Ninth Amendment.
198.

See Lash, The LostJurisprudence,supra note 1, at 639-52.

199.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

200.

See generally Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence,supra note 1.

201.

ELHANAN WINCHESTER, A PLAIN POLITICAL CATECHISM. INTENDED

FOR THE USE OF

SCHOOLS, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WHEREIN THE GREAT PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY, AND

OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ARE LAID DOWN AND EXPLAINED, BY WAY OF QUESTION AND
ANSWER. MADE LEVEL TO THE LOWEST CAPACITIES (Phila., Richard Folwell 1796), available at

Archive of Americana, Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800, No. 31645 (Readex,
NewsBank, Inc.).
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Answer:
All the powers not delegated to the United States, by the
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people. And the enumeration in the
constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others, retained by the people. So that a great number of
rights and powers, which the several states individually claim,
remain perfectly to them, notwithstanding this constitution .... 02
Like Madison, Reverend Winchester viewed the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as federalist guardians of reserved state rights and powers. Nor
was Winchester a proto-Calhounian: the good Reverend was an abolitionist.
2.

John Page's 1799 Remonstrance Against the Alien and Sedition Acts

In both his book and his most recent article, Professor Barnett presents
a dialogue from the floor of Congress between Theodore Sedgwick and
future Virginia Governor John Page during the debates over the Bill of
Rights.20

The discussion involved whether adding the specific right of

assembly to the First Amendment brought the Bill of Rights down to a level
of trivial rights (like the right to wear a hat) that could never be exhaustively
listed. Page's response was that men had in fact been forced to pull off their
hats in the past, and because the right to assemble likewise had been denied
in the past, it was worth adding the right to the list. 20 4 Barnett cites the
exchange to illustrate the personal nature of retained rights and claims that
"[t]his exchange stands in sharp contrast with the collective rights model"
because the discussion only involved references to "the people's" individual
rights. 2 °5 If Barnett means to imply that men like Page understood the
people's retained rights to include only (or even mainly) individual or
personal rights, this is rebutted by Page himself. Only a few years after his
discussion with Sedgwick, Page expressly described the Ninth Amendment as
protecting the retained rights of the States.
In his 1799 campaign pamphlet, Page argued that the Alien and
Sedition Acts were "not only unnecessary, impolitic and unjust, but
202. Id. at 50-51.
203. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 58-60; Bamett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 30-33.
204. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452-53 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. John Page).
Page stated:
[L]et me observe to him that such rights have been opposed, and a man has been
obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before the face of authority; people
have also been prevented from assembling together on their lawful occasions,
therefore it is well to guard against such stretches of authority, by inserting the
privilege in the declaration of rights.
Id.
205.

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supranote 8, at 32.
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unconstitutional."2 °6 According to Page, the Acts violated the retained rights
of the states as protected by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments (which he
refers to as the 11th and 12th articles):
The power therefore which congress has claimed and exercised in
enacting the alien act, not having been granted by the people in their
constitution, but on the contrary having been claimed and hitherto
wisely and patriotically exercised by the state legislatures, for the
benefit of individual states, and for the safety of the general
government, must be amongst those powers, which not having
been granted to congress, nor denied to the states, are declared by
the 11 th and 12th articles of the amendments to the constitution to
be reserved to the states respectively, and therefore the alien act is
an encroachment on those rights, and must be unconstitutional....
...Because

it is an interference with, and an encroachment on, the

reserved rights of the individual states, (see the 11th and 12th
articles of the amendments) ....
27
Page speaks interchangeably about reserved state rights and reserved
state powers. Both are protected by the combined effect of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. In fact, Page argued that the Ninth Amendment
actually enhanced the federalist effect of the Tenth. In another part of his
essay, Page addressed a report by the Virginia Minority that defended the
Acts as falling within the implied powers of Congress.2 0 8 The Minority Report
pointed out that under the earlier Articles of Confederation, the states
retained all powers not "expressly" delegated to the federal government.
The Tenth Amendment, however, omitted the term "expressly" and, thus,
implied a broader range of federal authority under the new Constitution.
Page rejected this reading of the Tenth Amendment and argued that the
combination of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments expressed the same
limited reading of federal power as that declared by Article II of the Articles
of Confederation. Because this is a newly discovered discussion of the Ninth

206.

JOHN

PAGE,

ADDRESS TO THE FREEHOLDERS OF GLOUCESTER

COUNTY, AT THEIR

ELECTION OF A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, TO REPRESENT THEIR DISTRICT, AND OF THEIR DELEGATES,
AND A SENATOR, TO REPRESENT THEM IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF

VIRGINIA, APR. 24, 1799, at 10 (RichmondJohn Dixon 1799), availableatArchive of Americana,

Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800, No. 36027 (Readex, NewsBank, Inc.). Page
was a member of Congress from 1789 to 1797 and Governor of Virginia from 1802 to 1805.
Thus, not only was he in Congress when Madison gave his Bank speech, he was a representative
from Virginia at the time that state was considering the Bill of Rights. He would be well aware of
Madison's opposition to the bank-indeed, the men regularly corresponded.
207. Id. at 13-14; see also 1JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 97 (Joseph Gales ed., 1820).
208. The Minority Report likely was written, at least in part, by future Chief Justice John
Marshall. See generally Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the
Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (2007).

93 IOWA LA WREVIEW

[20081

Amendment by a Founder involved with its framing, I have provided an
extended excerpt:
For how could it be supposed when the 2d article of the confederation
declared, that "each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is
not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the U. States, in
congress assembled," and the design of appointing a convention
and the authority given by the different confederated states to that
convention went no farther than to "render the then Federal
Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the
preservation of the union," (neither of which could require farther
powers in government than are expressly granted) that although
the convention omitted the insertion of a familiar article, whether
as unnecessary in their opinion, or, through design; (such as seems
now avowed) as the amendment was made, and as these words
preceded it in the 11th article, "the enumeration, in the Constitution, of
CERTAIN RIGHTS, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retainedby the people."
I SAY, considering these things, how could it be possible to suppose,
that these two amendments taken together, were not sufficient to
justify every citizen in saying, that the powers not delegated to the
United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people, as fully and
completely; as if the word expressly had been inserted? . . . And

candor, and a respect for the majority of congress which
recommended the amendments ought to induce us to think, that
they also were of the same opinion, and therefore that they would
not have recommended the addition of the 11th and 12th articles
to the constitution, had they not been called upon by some states
for such amendments ....209

Page was a member of Congress who helped frame and submit the Bill
of Rights, including the Ninth Amendment. He was a member of the House
when Madison gave his speech on the Bank of the United States, and he
represents yet another Virginian who had a distinctly federalist vision of the
Ninth Amendment. For years, historians have believed that the Ninth
Amendment played little, if any, role in the debates over the Alien and
Sedition Acts. In the process of preparing this Article, however, I discovered
not only Page's arguments, but also others who criticized the Acts as
violations of the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. 210 Page's testimony,

209.

PAGE, supra note 206, at 28-29.

210.
See, e.g., TUNIS WArORTM1AN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY AND THE
LIBERTY OF THE PRESS (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1800).
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however, is particularly significant as a fellow member of Congress who both
helped frame the Ninth Amendment and agreed with Madison's federalist
reading of the Amendment.
3.

St. George Tucker's 1803 "View of the Constitution"

Ajudge on the Supreme Court of Virginia, Tucker's 1803 "View of the
Constitution" was the most influential Constitutional treatise in the United
States prior to 1833 when Justice Joseph Story published his Commentaries on
the Constitution.11 Tucker's "View" was the states' rights treatise of the early
nineteenth century. Justice Story later attacked Tucker's work (including his
writing on the Ninth Amendment) as the prime example of the states'
rights-protective "compact theory" of the Constitution."' Tucker was so
devoted to states' rights that throughout his life he refused to believe that
the Articles of Confederation had been abrogated by the adoption of the
Federal Constitution.2 3 As one would expect, Tucker's views of the Ninth
Amendment reflect his overarching theory of a federalist constitution as a
compact between the states and the federal government.
Tucker's federalist view of the Ninth Amendment is clear from the very
first section of his treatise. There, Tucker addresses the people's
fundamental collective right to alter or abolish their form of government
whenever they see fit:
It must be owned that Mr. Locke, and other theoretical writers,
have held, that "there remains still inherent in the people a
supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find
the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for, when
such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, and devolves to those
2 14
who gave it."

211.

Tucker's "View on the Constitution" is Note D to the appendix of his treatise

on Blackstone's Commentaries. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES,

supra note 25, app.

Note D.
212. In his Commentaries on the Constitution,Joseph Story quotes Tucker's discussion of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. 1 STORY, supranote 108, § 410, at 393-94. Story then criticizes
Tucker's rnle of strict construction as based not on the "rights of the peope but on the "rights
of the states." Id. § 411, at 394. Story evidently read Tucker's interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment as a states' rights interpretation, despite Tucker's language of personal liberty. In
fact, Tucker's work was widely regarded as representing a states' rights perspective of
constitutional interpretation. See G. EDWARD WHITE, 3-4 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 86-87 (Paul
A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988) (noting that Tucker "was particularly concerned with
the preservation of state sovereignty").
213.
2 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 25, at 128 n.5 ("The declarations
of rights, of the people of the United States are contained ....
[i] n the articles of confederation
and perpetual union, concluded between the several states; which perhaps were abrogated.").
214.

Id. at 162 (internal citation omitted).
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In a footnote following his quotation of Locke, Tucker notes that "[t]his
principle is expressly recognized in our government, Amendments to the C.
U. S. Art. 11, 12. "215 The reference is to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
which at the time
were 11th and 12th on the original list of twelve proposed
216
amendments.
Here, Tucker links the Ninth Amendment to the people's retained
collective right to revolution. 217' There is no reference to individual rights.218
Instead, Tucker speaks of powers devolving to the people on a state-by-state
basis (thus the pairing with the Tenth Amendment). As did Madison,
Tucker understood that the concepts of "powers" and "rights" are
inextricably linked: a delegated right is an extension of power, and a
retained right is a reservation of power. 1 9 In this case, the people's retained
right to revolution includes the right to recall a delegation of power when
the government abuses its trust. More, the reference to the Tenth
Amendment exemplifies Tucker's view that the "people" exist as
independent sovereigns in the several states. There is much more that can
be said about Tucker's federalist reading of the Constitution. 2 For now, it is
enough to note that although Barnett discusses Tucker at length in his
recent article, 22 he appears to have missed Tucker's expressly federalist
222
rendering of the Ninth Amendment in the above passage.
Despite Barnett's best efforts to read libertarian theory into the writing
of St. George Tucker, Tucker's view of the Constitution remains one of the
most closely reasoned and influential works of federalist theory to emerge in
the early period of the Constitution. 22' His views of the Ninth and Tenth
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 162 n.25.
1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 97 (Joseph Gales ed., 1820).
This single passage explodes Professor Barnett's claim that "no direct or indirect

evidence" supports Amar's claim about the Ninth Amendment protecting this collective right of
the people. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 22. Barnett himself relies on Tucker

as evidence of the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 169-75.
218. Barnett claims that the right of revolution can be understood as an individual natural
right. The Founders would not have agreed. Retained individual natural rights were those that
could be perfected by the individual himself, without any collective assistance from others. For

example, the retained ight to religious belief or political opinion. Obviously, revolutionary
alteration of the standing government does not fall into this category. This is a right retained

and exercised by the collective people.
219. See, e.g., Remarks of James Wilson, Debates in the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania (Oct. 28, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 436 ("A bill of rights
annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the powers reserved.").

220. For a general discussion of St. George Tucker's federalist vision of the Constitution,
see Lash, supranote 109 passim.
221.

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 69-75.

222.
223.

As had I prior to researching this Article.
Tucker also saw the bank episode as an instance of violating the Tenth Amendment-

not the Ninth Amendment. This tells us, among other things, that Tucker did not see the issue

in the bank episode as having anything to do with individual rights. Tucker, of course, read the
Tenth as a rule of construction protecting the rights of the states. See I TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
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Amendments24 reflected this same theory. One final point: Tucker was an
abolitionist.

4.

1805: The Earliest Discovered State Court Application of the Ninth
Amendment-By a Ratifier of the Constitution

John Overton was a member of the second North Carolina Ratifying
Convention. 22 5 Although the first North Carolina Convention neither
accepted nor rejected the Constitution, the second convention voted in
favor of ratification in 1789.226 Overton went on to join the Tennessee bench
and preside over a case that contained one of the earliest state judicial
references to the Ninth Amendment. The background issue involved
whether a state property judgment was binding on a portion of land falling
within Indian territory. Overton held that it was, based in part on the
retained sovereignty of the states as protected under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. Once again, as it is a newly uncovered piece of historical
evidence regarding the Ninth Amendment, I provide an extended excerpt:
But how far has the Constitution and laws of the United States,
made in pursuance of it, abridged the sovereign rights of each
State? The answer is easy. No further than the States have expressly,
and not by equitable construction, delegated authority to the
United States. The Constitution of the United States was proposed
to each State possessing the rights of sovereignty within their
respective limits. It proposed that each State should give up a
portion of its sovereignty for the more secure and convenient
enjoyment of the remainder.
This construction is conformable to the law of nature applied to
nations. By this law, nations as well as individuals are tenacious of
the rights of self-preservation, of which, as applied to sovereign
States, the right of soil or eminent domain is one. Constitutions,
treaties, or laws, in derogation of these rights are to be construed
COMMENTARIES, supra note 25, app. Note D, at 287 n.* (citing Madison's Report on the Alien

and Sedition Acts).
224. See generally ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A Dissertationon Slavery: With a Proposalfor the Gradual
Abolition of It, in the State of Virginia (1796), in VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 409 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1999).

225. After serving as a delegate to the second convention, Overton was later elected to the
Superior Court of Tennessee, the precursor to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Theodore
Brown, Jr., John Overton 1766-1833, in TENNESSEE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY AND CULTURE,
http://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/imagegallery.php?EntryD=0023 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
226. North Carolina's initial ratification convention debated the Constitution, drafted a
"Declaration of Rights" and "Amendments," and voted "neither to ratify nor reject the
Constitution." Resolution of the North Carolina Convention (Aug. 1, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 59, at 243, 249, 251. Over a year later, North Carolina ratified the
Constitution. Resolution of the North Carolina Convention (Nov. 21, 1789), in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 290.
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strictly. Vattel is of this opinion, and, what is more satisfactory, the
Federalist, and the American author of the Notes to Blackstone's
Commentaries, two of the most eminent writers on jurisprudence,
are of the same opinion. [HereJudge Overton cites, among other things,
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and Tucker's discussion of the same.22 7]
The Constitution of the United States gave the power to the
General Government to regulate intercourse with the Indians and
to make treaties. The States, having conceded these powers, no
longer possess them. The Constitution was a dead letter until the
treaties and the laws of the United States pointed out the principles
of this intercourse. By treaty certain lands within the limits of the
State are in its language "[sic] allotted, granted, and secured to the
Indians, within which the citizens are not to hunt, drive stock,
survey, nor even go there without permission. If they do, or commit
other trespasses, they are subject to heavy penalties. But does the
Constitution of the United States or its laws take from the sovereign
rights of the State further than is incompatible with these
regulations? They do not.22 s
Overton reads the Ninth Amendment as preserving the retained rights
of the states. He has no difficulty in finding this same federalist reading of
the Ninth Amendment in the works of St. George Tucker. Like Tucker,
Overton-one of the ratifiers of the original Constitution-read the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments as creating a rule of strict construction of federal
power, preserving where possible the concurrent power of the states.
5.

1811: Defending the State's Right to Grant a Steamboat Monopoly

New York's decision to grant Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a
monopoly on ferryboat traffic between ports in New Jersey and Manhattan
Island triggered a series of lawsuits that culminated with the Supreme
Court's invalidation of the monopoly in Gibbons v. Ogden.229 In the decades
prior to that case, however, New York had successfully defended its
monopoly before the New York courts. In 1811, an anonymous author
published an extended defense of the monopoly, arguing, among other
things, that the states retained the right to grant monopolies under the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
It is hardly necessary to add that the 12th amendment, can have no
other influence on this question than to strengthen this position.

227. Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith & Blackwell, I Tenn. (1 Overt.) 144, 166 n.1 (1805).
The footnote in full reads: ("See Vat. B. 2 c, 17, §§ 305, 308; Amendment to Con. U. S. arts 11,
12; 1 T. BI. app. to part 1, 307, 308; Ib.412; Vat. B. 1, c. 1, § 10; 2 Dali. 384; 1 T. BI. app. to part
1, 269; 4Johns. 163.").

228.
229.

Id. at 166-67.
Gibbonsv. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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This amendment was made, not to give additional powers to the
Federal Government, not one of them tending to this object, but to
guard the States against a constructive extension of those powers. If
then certain powers were by a fair construction equally within the
jurisdiction of Congress and the States respectively, such powers
could not by force of this restrictive amendment, be taken from the
States and vested in Congress, particularly when the preceding
article of the amendment, contains an express provision against
this constructive assumption of power. 11 th Art. "The enumeration
in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people;" thus the enumeration
of the right of arming the militia, and maintaining a navy shall not
disparage the right that the States have to arm the militia, or to
3
keep a navy in time of war...."'
The author reads the Ninth Amendment as guarding against
constructive extensions of federal power in matters involving the concurrent
authority of the states. As we shall see, Supreme Court Justice Story adopted
this Ninth Amendment-based defense of concurrent state power in a case
involving, coincidentally enough, concurrent state powers over matters
involving the militia. Like John Page, the author reads the Ninth
Amendment as enhancing the federalist protections of the Tenth
Amendment. Nothing here involves individual rights; this is purely a matter
of the retained rights of state majorities.
6.

The Continued Debates Regarding the Bank of the United States

Although Madison failed to convince a majority to reject the Bank of
the United States in 1791, his arguments continued to resonate over the
next two decades. In 1811, during the congressional debate over renewing
the Bank charter, opponents agreed with Madison that the latitude of
construction pressed by the Bank's proponents exceeded congressional
power. As Representative William Burwell pointed out to the assembly, the
subject of the Bank had been "more thoroughly examined in 1791, and
more ably elucidated than any other since the adoption of the Government.
The celebrated speech of Mr. MADISON, to which I ascribe my conviction,
has been recently presented to us in the newspapers, and gentlemen must
be familiar with it." 2 1 Representative William Barry echoed Burwell's praise

230.
THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO GRANT EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES, IN ROADS, BRIDGES, CANALS,
NAVIGABLE WATERS, &C. VINDICATED BY A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THE GRANT FROM THE STATE
OF NEW-YORK TO, AND CONTRACT WITH ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND ROBERT FULTON, FOR THE
EXCLUSIVE NAVIGATION OF VESSELS, BY STEAM OR FIRE, FOR A LIMITED TIME, ON THE WATERS OF
SAID STATE, AND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION THEREOF 18 (1811) (No. 23819), microformed on
Archive of Americana, Early American Imprints, Series II: Shaw-Shoemaker, 1801-1819
(Readex, NewsBank, Inc).
231.

22 ANNALS OF CONG. 584 (1811) (statement of Rep. William Burwell).

93 IOWA LAWPREVIEW

[2008]

of Madison's "perspicuous and luminous argument that has been so justly
celebrated as defining and marking out the proper limits of power assigned
to the General Government."232 These men obviously would be aware of how
Madison relied on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Others expressly
relied on the Ninth Amendment alone. According to Representative (and
future Vice President) RichardJohnson:
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people";
which amendment refers to the prohibitions to be found in the
ninth section of the first article, and others of the same kind ...
[listing examples]. And more especially the tenth amendment...
[quoting the Tenth].
The parts of the Constitution recited prove the position taken, that
the Constitution is a grant of specified powers; that we can exercise
233
no power not expressly delegated to us ....
Likewise, Representative William Crawford argued:
Congress cannot therefore usurp this power over the States, so
explicitly and expressly reserved, without a flagrant violation of this
(not an interpolation as it has been jesuitically styled, but) integral
part of the Constitution. This opinion is confirmed by article ninth,
amendments to the Constitution, which declares, that the
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny, or disparage, others retained by the people. But
the people have retained the right to establish banks-for all banks
not delegated to the people [sic234], or prohibited to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people....
(Power to incorporate a bank] is of too imperious a nature to
[..
be sought for by implication, inclusion, or as an incidental means
to carry any other power into effect .... If it had ever been parted
with, it was5 all-important that it should have been parted with
8
expressly.
The same Ninth Amendment-based arguments were raised in the
Senate. Senator William Giles, for example, recounted the concerns that led

232.
233.
234.
referred

Id. at 696 (statement of Rep. William T. Barry).
Id. at 720-21 (statement of Rep. Richard Johnson).
Either the reporter or Crawford is referring to the federal government and mistakenly
to the people. This is clear from the full text.

235.

22 ANNALS OF CONG. 751, 753 (statement of Rep. William Crawford). Note the use of

Madison's argument in his original speech against the Bank. See supra notes 161-67 and
accompanying text.
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to the adoption of a Constitution that reserved all unenumerated powers to
the states:
From this short history of the origin of the Constitution, and the
causes which produced it, it evidently appears, that the General or
Federal Government is in its nature and character a Government of
enumerated powers, taken from previously existing States
governments, enumerated and conferred on it, reserving all
unenumerated powers to the State governments, or to the people
in their individual capacities. But if any doubts had existed on this
subject, two amendments to the Constitution, growing out of some
jealousies lest a contrary interpretation should be given to the
Constitution, have been adopted, which ought to put this question
to rest forever. The 9th and 10th articles of amendment to the
constitution are as follows: ... (quotes both the Ninth and Tenth].
Now, sir, can language be more explicit than this, in declaring that
all not
this charter contains enumerated powers, and that
36
enumerated are reserved to the States or to the people?
The Bank's proponents disagreed that the charter violated the Ninth
Amendment, but they accepted the federalist nature of the Amendment. For
example, Senator John Taylor argued that Congress had not rigorously
applied the Ninth Amendment in the past and that if one took the obvious
meaning of the Ninth Amendment to its logical conclusion, Congress could
not operate:
The Gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) has called attention of
the Senate to the 9th article of the amendments to the Constitution
... [quotes the amendment].... I know not how Mr. ADAMS found
the States so much asleep to their rights when he tempted their
citizens to become usurers, and this too in denial and
disparagement of State powers actually exercised. If the present
vigilance had then been exerted, I should suppose he was very
lucky that he was not as much harassed as were some of the victims
of the sedition law. Carry this doctrine of rigid construction in
respect to this instance of collision of State and United State
authorities to the extent contended for by the opposers of the
bill-enforce to the fullest extent, according to its obvious
meaning, the amendment last quoted, and we shall be surrounded

with powers that we dare not use .

236.
237.

27

22 ANNALS OF CONG. 182-83 (statement of Sen. William Giles).
Id. at 301-02.

93 IOWA LA WRE VIEW

7.

[2008]

The Retained Concurrent Powers of the States

In 1807, a petition was sent to Congress on behalf of "sundry citizens of
the United States" asking that Congress allow the state courts concurrent
jurisdiction over diversity cases despite the preferences of the plaintiff.23"
The petition grounded its argument on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
which, to the petitioners, preserved wherever possible the concurrent
powers of the states. 3 9 In 1808, Senator James Lloyd cited the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments as limiting federal regulation of commerce. 240 The
argument had nothing to do with individual rights and everything to do with
state autonomy. 241 In the murder trial of Cyrus Dean, the Supreme Court of
Vermont rejected a claim that an alien freeholder could not serve as a grand
juror due to exclusive federal authority over immigrants. According to the
Court, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments established the state's retained
concurrent right to determine the rights of alien freeholders within the
state.242
In 1816, a South Carolina court was faced with the question of whether
states have the authority to prosecute persons passing counterfeit federal
coins.2 43 Although the Constitution expressly empowers the federal
government to punish counterfeiters, 244 it was not clear whether this express
enumeration should be interpreted to prohibit the concurrent power of the
states to punish persons passing counterfeit coins. Writing for the South
Carolina Supreme Court, Judge Grimke noted that the Constitution does
not expressly grant Congress the power to punish persons passing
245
counterfeit coins. Applying a rule of construction based on the Ninth and

238.

1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 480 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).

239.

Id.

240.
241.

19 ANNALS OF CONG. 251 (statement of Sen.James Lloyd).
Id.

242.

See THE TRIAL OF CYRUS B. DEAN, FOR THE MURDER OF JONATHAN ORMSBY AND ASA

MARSH, BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, AT THEIR
SPECIAL SESSIONS, BEGUN AND HOLDEN AT BURLINGTON, CHITENDEN COUNTY, ON THE 23D OF

AUGUST, A.D. 1808. REVISED AND CORRECTED FROM THE MINUTES OF THEJUDGES 47 (Burlington,

Samuel Mills 1808), available at The Making of Modem
Q4200252612 (Thomson Gale). The court stated:

Law: Trials 1600-1926, No.

We learn from the eleventh and twelfth articles of the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States . . . [then quotes the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments]. If then, Congress have power to intermeddle with the soil within a
State's jurisdiction-to say who should, or rather who should not hold or possess it,
this power must have been expressly delegated to the government of the United
States.
Id.
243. State v. Antonio, 2-3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 605, 605, 609, 612-13, 615 (1816).
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 ("Congress shall have power . . . [t]o provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States ...
245. Antonio, 2-3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) at 609-10.
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Tenth Amendments, Judge Grimke concluded that this, then, was a power
retained by the states:
[I]t does not appear that the power of punishing persons for
passing counterfeit coin, knowing it to be counterfeit, was either
expressly given to the Congress of the United States, or divested
out of the individual States. Now the 9th section of the
amendments to the constitution, as agreed to by the several States,
and which has now become a component part of the constitution,
declares, that the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people; and in the 10th section of the same, it is further provided,
that the powers not delegated to the United States by the
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the State, are reserved to the
States, respectively, or to the people. When we examine the powers
conceded by the individual states, we find no enumeration of this
power given to Congress, and when we review the powers denied to
the individual States, we discover no mention whatever of their
being divested of this power. The individual States were in
possession of this power before the ratification of the constitution
of the United States; and if there is no express declaration in that
instrument, which deprives them of it, they must still retain it,
unless they should be divested thereof by construction, or
implication. 246
Grimke read the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as applying to powers
exercised by the states prior to the adoption of the Constitution.247 If the
Constitution does not expressly grant such powers to the federal
government or divest them from the states, then under the Ninth
Amendment, courts should interpret enumerated federal power in a
manner retaining such rights to the states. Other courts repeated this idea of
retained concurrent-state power. In Livingston v. Van Ingen, the State of
New York had granted a ferry monopoly to Robert Livingston and
Robert Fulton248 by virtue of their "new and advantageous" mode of
246. Id. (internal citation omitted).
247. From Judge Nott's dissent in this case, it appears the Ninth Amendment was the
primary clause relied on to support concurrent jurisdiction:
The advocates for a concurrent jurisdiction derive no support from the
amendment of the constitution which has been relied on. It does not say that the
powers not expressly delegated, &c., shall be reserved; but that the enumeration of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people; and whether by express or necessary implication, the effect is the same.
Id. at 618 (NottJ., dissenting).
248. This monopoly would be the subject of a great deal of litigation. See, e.g., Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In North River Steam Boat Co. v. Livingston, 1 Hopk. Ch. 170
(N.Y. Ch. 1824), Livingston argued that neither the Ninth nor Tenth Amendment reserved
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• 249
transportation. A competitor claimed that granting such monopolies was
an exclusive power of the federal government under its enumerated powers
to "'promote the progress of science and useful arts"' and to regulate
25
Emmet, 251
interstate commerce. 0 Livingston's counsel, Thomas A.
responded that the federal government had only such power as was
expressly granted and that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserved all
other powers to the states.252
In 1817, State Supreme Court Judge William Tilghman embraced the
same federalist reading of the Ninth Amendment:

Antecedent to the adoption of the Federal constitution, the power
of the several states was supreme and unlimited. It follows,
therefore, that all power, not transferred to the United States,
remains in the states and the people, according to their several
constitutions. This would have been the sound construction of the
constitution, without amendment. But the jealousy of those, who
feared that the federal government would absorb all the power of
expressly recognised in the 11 th and 12th
the states, caused it to be
253
articles of amendment.

powers or rights to the states, but only to "the people." Thus, the state had no right to interfere
with his ferry operations from one place to another in New York waters. See id. at 182-84. The
court ignored his argument, ruling instead that his ferry run was protected under the holding
of Gibbons v. Ogden, since it involved stops on both the New York and New Jersey sides of the
water. Id. at 227-28.
249. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9Johns. 507, 507 (N.Y. 1812).
250. Id. at 515 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
251. Thomas Emmet argued a number of important cases in state and federal court,
including the Supreme Court, between 1815 and 1824. See WHITE, supra note 212, at 204-14.
The culmination of his legal career was his argument before the Supreme Court in Gibbons v.
Ogden. Id. at 210-11.
252. According to Emmet:
In the year 1789, certain amendments to the constitution were proposed; and of
the articles adopted, the ninth and tenth were, "that the enumeration in the
constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." That "the powers not delegated to the United States by the
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people."
The convention of this state adopted the constitution with the explanation given
by General Hamilton, who was a member, that no powers were conferred on
congress but such as were explicitly given by the constitution.
Livingston, 9Johns. at 550.
253. Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court (1806-1827), William
Tilghman was a federalist midnight justice who lost his seat with the repeal of the Judiciary Act.
Farmers' & Mechs' Bank v. Smith, 3 Serg. & Rawle 63, 68 (Pa. 1817).
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Judge Tilghman was a member of the Federalist Party and likely shared
his party's broad view of national power. This makes all the more significant
his embrace of a state-protective reading of the Ninth Amendment.
8.

1820: The First Supreme Court Discussion of the Ninth Amendment

In 1820, John Taylor declared, in his book Construction Construed and
Constitutions Vindicated, that:
The eleventh [Ninth] amendment prohibits a construction by which
the rights retained by the people shall be denied or disparaged; and
the twelfth [Tenth Amendment] "reserves to the states respectively or
to the people the powers not delegated to the United States, nor
prohibited to the states." The precision of these expressions is
happily contrived to defeat a construction, by which the origin of
the union, or the sovereignty of the states, could be rendered at all
doubtful. 54
Taylor was an ardent states' rights advocate, and his thoughts on the
Ninth Amendment perhaps should be taken with a grain of salt given the
distance from the original ratification of the Ninth Amendment. The same
year Taylor published his book, however, the very nationalist Justice Story
embraced the very same view of the Ninth Amendment.
The first discussion of the Ninth Amendment in a Supreme Court case
(only recently identified) occurred in Houston v. Moore (1820), in a
dissenting opinion by Justice Joseph Story. 255 Once again, the decision
arrived before the rise of Calhoun's nullification doctrine, and Justice Story
is not known for his favoring of states' rights. Nevertheless, according to
Justice Story, the letter and spirit of the Ninth Amendment called for a
narrow reading of federal power in order to preserve the concurrent powers
of the states.
Houston involved the question of whether the states retained the
concurrent power to establish disciplinary rules for the militia, given the
express enumerated power of Congress to regulate the militia. The case did
not involve any claimed individual right. This important and influential case
deserves more space than I can devote here. 256 In brief, the majority upheld
the state disciplinary action, drawing a dissent from Justice Story. In that
dissent, Justice Story laid out what he viewed as the proper approach to

254. TAYLOR, supranote 25, at 46. Thomas Jefferson called Taylor's book "the most logical
retraction of our governments to the original and true principles of the constitution creating
them, which has appeared since the adoption of that instrument." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Spencer Roane (June 27, 1821), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 189 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
255. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
256. See id. at 1-4. For a more complete discussion, see Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence,supra
note 1, at 613-22.
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determining concurrent state power over a given subject. His opinion is
worth reading in full as an early example of how a court can apply the Ninth
Amendment in a live case or controversy. For our purposes, it is enough to
simply quote Justice Story's declaration that "it seems unquestionable that
the States retain concurrent authority with Congress, not only upon the
letter and spirit of the [Ninth] amendment
of the constitution, but upon the
2 57
soundest principles of general reasoning."
To the dismay of those who supported his nomination to the Court,
Joseph Story turned out to be a strongly nationalist Justice. He had no
incentive to find state-protective provisions in the Bill of Rights or anywhere
else in the Constitution. Nevertheless, Justice Story followed the traditional
account of the Ninth and viewed it-wholly apart from the Tenth
Amendment-as a provision that guards the concurrent authority of the
states. Later Supreme Court cases quoted Justice Story's discussion of the
Ninth Amendment, and countless state and federal court judges for the next
one-hundred years echoed Justice Story's reading of the Ninth Amendment.
In fact, an early compendium of the opinions of ChiefJustice John Marshall
included Justice Story's opinion in Houston, since the great Chief Justice
5
apparently joined Justice Story's dissent. 1
9.

Summation

At some point the mercy rule should apply. I have not selected only
federalist references to the Ninth Amendment by courts and commentators
and omitted others. There are no references to a libertarian Ninth
Amendment during this period. 259 With the exception of a defendant's
attempt to use the Ninth Amendment (and Tenth!) in support of the right
to trial by jury-an attempt ignored by the court-the historical record is
devoid of libertarian readings of the Ninth Amendment. 260 Scholarly and
judicial commentary is extensive and uniformly federalist, and I have no
doubt that further research will uncover many more examples. Indeed, seem to uncover more every time I run a general search in a historical
database. Many of the above examples were uncovered just during the
preparation of this Article.
257. Houston, 18 U.S. at 49 (Story, J., dissenting). In the actual quote, Story refers to the
Ninth as the "eleventh" amendment, reflecting an early custom of referring to the first ten
amendments according to their placement on an original list of twelve proposed amendments.
Our Ninth was eleventh on that list.
258.

THE WRITINGS OF JOHN MARSHALL, LATE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, UPON

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 560-97 (Boston,James Munroe & Co. 1839).

259. It would not undermine the conclusions of this Article if there are such individualrights uses of the Ninth Amendment during this period. Again, the federalist Ninth
Amendment would be understood to apply to the denial or disparagement of any right,
individual or collective. The extensive pairing of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as
federalist provisions, however, is impossible to ignore.
260. See Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence,supranote 1, at 605.
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I have limited my analysis of post-adoption commentary in deference to
Professor Barnett's claim that Calhounian state-rights theory in the years
leading up to the Civil War might have tainted later sources. There is much
more, and again, I believe that all pre-Civil War commentary is relevant to
the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment. But even under this limited view
of the evidence, the record is unequivocal: from the moment of its
submission to the states to its earliest application in state and federal court,
the Ninth Amendment was broadly viewed as a provision guarding the
retained sovereignty of the states. This testimony includes those involved
with drafting the Amendment and its ratification.
B.

THE TENTH AMENDMENT

The ubiquitous pairing of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments not only
highlights the federalist character of the Ninth Amendment, it also shows
how the Tenth Amendment, as well as the Ninth Amendment, were read as
establishing a rule of strict construction of federal power. The semantic
meaning of the text of the Tenth Amendment does not expressly announce
such a rule (one of the reasons why Randolph did not think it would have
"much effect").26I It is clear, however, that the Tenth Amendment quickly
came to be viewed as implying a federalist rule of construction. As I have
written elsewhere, ultimately the Tenth Amendment would eclipse the
Ninth Amendment as the primary text supporting a federalist interpretation
of the Constitution. 262
263
Although there are earlier examples, perhaps the biggest reason why
states' rights theorists came to emphasize the Tenth Amendment over the
Ninth Amendment involves what came to be known as James Madison's
"Celebrated Report of 1800.' 264 This extended defense of the Virginia
Resolutions against the Alien and Sedition Acts explored in detail the
Resolutions' claim that the Acts violated a number of Constitutional
261. For a discussion of primary semantic versus secondary implied meanings, particularly
in regard to the Ninth Amendment, see generally Lash, A Textual-HistoricalTheory, supranote 1.
262. See Kurt T. Lash, James Madison's CelebratedReport of 1800: The Transformation of the Tenth
Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 165, 194 (2006) [hereinafter Lash, Madison's Report].
263. See Edmund Randolph, The Constitutionalityof the Bank Bill (Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted in
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATrORNEYS GENERAL 4 (1999) (claiming

that chartering a national bank would violate the Tenth Amendment). In a forthcoming Article,
I explain how last minute changes to the language of the Tenth Amendment inserted a
principle of popular sovereignty which itself could be read as implying strict construction of
federal power. See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth
Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and "Expressly" Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
(forthcoming May 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=

1000087.
264. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, in 6 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra
note 28, at 341. The full title of Madison's Report is "Report of the Committee to whom were

referred the Communications of various States, relative to the Resolutions of the last General
Assembly of this State, concerning the Alien and Sedition Laws." Id.
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principles, including those announced by the First and Tenth Amendments.
The Report became the "magna charta" of states' rights advocates and found
its way into almost every tract and essay on state autonomy during the
nineteenth century.2 6 5 It clearly influenced St. George Tucker's view of the

Constitution. Tucker cites to the Report repeatedly and shares Madison's
use of the Tenth Amendment in the Report as counseling a narrow
construction of federal power. 266 Given the status of Madison's Report and
the influence of Tucker's treatise, it is not surprising that Madison's Tenth
Amendment-based defense of state rights established the general argument
upon which later states' rights theory would be based. It is important to
note, however, that the rise of the Tenth Amendment was not accompanied
by a decline in federalist readings of the Ninth Amendment. Throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ninth Amendment
continued to be read in tandem with the Tenth
Amendment as one of the
67
dual guardians of federalism and states' rights.2
Professor Barnett believes that Madison's decision to rely on the Tenth
Amendment and not the Ninth Amendment in his "Celebrated Report"
undermines my claims about the federalist Ninth Amendment. According to
Barnett, if the Ninth Amendment calls for a limited reading of federal power
in order to preserve state autonomy, then Madison should have relied on the
Ninth Amendment in his objections to the Alien and Sedition Acts. 2 8
Barnett further claims that Madison's emphasis on the Tenth Amendment
shows that this Amendment, and not the Ninth Amendment, was
understood as a rule of construction guarding states' rights. 269
There are a number of problems with this argument. To begin with,
Barnett seems unaware of the many federalist uses of the Ninth Amendment
during the same period. 270 Whatever else one might conclude about the
Alien and Sedition Act controversy, one cannot conclude that the Ninth
Amendment was not understood at the time as a federalist rule of
construction. There are too many examples to the contrary. Secondly, we
know that men like John Page did rely on federalist readings of the Ninth
Amendment in their opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts. 2 7' Finally,
nothing in Madison's Report repudiates, or even undermines, his earlier
express statements about the Ninth Amendment. Barnett tries to imply
otherwise by making it seem that if it had been possible to use the Ninth
Amendment, then Madison should have used the Ninth Amendment.
Because he did not, this means that the Ninth Amendment was not
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See Lash, Madison's Report, supra note 262, at 182-86.
Id. at 182-83.
See generally Lash, The LostJurisprudence,supra note 1.
See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 65.
Id. at 69.
See sources cited and discussion supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.A.2.
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understood as a federalist rule of construction. Barnett's theory is a logical
fallacy, however: one cannot get "should have" out of "could have."
In fact, there was good reason for Madison to discuss the Tenth
Amendment and not the Ninth Amendment, even if a Ninth Amendment
argument was possible. Although Madison's Report addressed arguments
against the Alien and Sedition Acts, this was not its primary purpose.
Madison's Report was a defense of the Virginia Resolutions at a time when
political backlash from those Resolutions threatened to negatively affect the
political hopes of the Republican Party in Virginia. 72 Because the
Resolutions based their argument on the First and Tenth Amendments,
Madison had to do the same to defend them.
In December of 1798, the Virginia Legislature adopted and
promulgated the (in)famous "Virginia Resolutions." Ghost-written by James
Madison, the Resolutions declared that the Alien and Sedition Acts were a
"deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted
by the said compact [the Constitution]." 273 Because the "acts aforesaid were
unconstitutional," the states therefore were "duty bound to interpose for
arresting the progress of the evil."274 Accordingly, the "General Assembly
doth solemnly appeal to the like dispositions of the other States, in
confidence that they will concur with this Commonwealth," and will "cooperat[e] with this State, in maintaining unimpaired the authorities,
rights,
2 75
and liberties reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
This was no ordinary objection to an act of Congress. Earlier
controversies, like that involving the Bank of the United States, had raised
the issue of proper interpretation of enumerated federal power. In this case,
however, Virginia accused the federal government of deliberately exercising
an extra-constitutional power, and the Assembly called upon other states to
join them in "interposing" against enforcement of the Acts. This incendiary
action 276 threatened the continued stability of union. Madison was well
aware of the delicacy of the situation and feared that the Assembly's
Resolutions might be read as usurping the people's ultimate right to decide
whether there had been an unacceptable breach in the constitutional
compact. 277 AS it turned out, the Resolutions were rejected by most other
states whose assemblies issued stinging rebukes against Virginia and

272.
273.

See RALPH KETCHAM,JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 399 (1990).

James Madison, Virginia Resolutions Against the Alien and Sedition Acts (Dec. 21,
1789), in 6 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 28, at 326.
274. Id. at 331, 326.
275. Id. at 330-31.
276. Had the Resolutions been produced anywhere but on the floor of the Assembly, the
members would have likely been prosecuted under the very Act they opposed.
277. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 29, 1798), in 6 WRITINGS OF
MADISON, supra note 28, at 328-29.
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Kentucky's unjustified and dangerous tilt toward disunion. The backlash
put the Republicans on the defensive at just the moment when they had
hoped political opposition to the Acts would lead to victory in the
presidential elections of 1800. It was politically important that the
Resolutions received a strong2 79defense, and Madison provided one in spades
with his "Celebrated Report."

As Barnett points out, although Madison's Report addresses the proper
construction of federal power, its arguments are based on the First and
Tenth Amendments, not the Ninth."s Although Barnett believes this proves
Madison did not read the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction
protecting the states from overweening federal power, his claim
misunderstands the purpose of the Report. The Virginia Resolutions were
short and to the point: Congress had done more than merely adopted a
"latitudinary" construction of its enumerated powers. Congress had clearly
and intentionally sought to exercise an unenumerated power .28 This is not a
Ninth Amendment issue-this is a Tenth Amendment issue. It was because
of this serious and "palpable" violation that Virginia believed a coordinated
act of opposition was warranted. 2822 In his defense of the Resolutions,
Madison could not rely on Ninth Amendment arguments of undue
construction of enumerated power. This would not justify the more serious
assertions of the Virginia Resolutions, and it would reduce the issue to the
same issue as the Bank controversy-a controversy neither Madison nor
anyone else believed warranted coordinated state opposition."" His Report

278.

See Answers of the Several State Legislatures, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at

532-39. According to Christian Fritz, the rebukes came from Federalist majorities in other
states and masked considerable agreement among dissenters in those states. See CHRISTIAN G.
FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 202 (2007).
279. The defensive posture of the Report is established in its opening paragraphs. After
lightly objecting to the tone of some of the objections to the Virginia Resolutions, Madison
concedes a defense is in order:
The committee have deemed it a more useful task, to revise with a critical eye, the
resolutions which have met with this disapprobation; to examine fully the several
objections and arguments which have appeared against them; and to enquire
whether there be any errors of fact, of principle, or of reasoning, which the
candour of the General Assembly ought to acknowledge and correct.
James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, in 6 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 28, at
342.
280. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 64.
281. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions Against the Alien and Sedition Acts (Dec. 21,
1789), in 6 WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 28, at 326, 328.
282. Id.
283. In fact, the Resolutions themselves distinguish earlier disputes over broad
constructions of federal power from the current objections to the Alien and Sedition Acts. See
id. at 327.
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accordingly ties all of its arguments to the basic point that Congress had
exercised a power nowhere granted in the Constitution.284
The rise of the Tenth Amendment as an independent federalist rule of
construction is an important story in its own right.28 15 Madison's focus on the

Tenth Amendment in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, however,
neither undermines his description of the Ninth Amendment in his speech
on the Bank of the United States nor conflicts with the many other examples
of federalist applications of the Ninth Amendment during the same period.
Madison's speech does show how application of the two Amendments may
overlap, but that cannot come as any surprise. Madison himself linked the
two as supporting the general rule of limited interpretation of federal power
in his speech on the Bank of the United States. 6 We also know that postadoption courts and commentators all saw the two amendments as
expressing closely related principles of preserved state autonomy. 287
VI. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

This Article has focused on the original meaning of the Ninth
Amendment. If one seeks the original meaning of the Constitution in order
to vindicate the sovereign right of the people to establish fundamental law,
however, then one must consider the impact of later amendments on the
original scope and operative effect of the Ninth Amendment. The people,
after all, have the sovereign right to alter or abolish constitutional principles
as they see fit. 288 Of particular importance is the impact of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Whatever the scope of local autonomy under the original

284.

According to Madison's Report:
[5.] That the General Assembly doth particularly protest against the palpable and
alarming infractions of the Constitution in the two late cases of the "Alien and
Sedition Acts," . . . the first of which exercises a power nowhere delegated to the
Federal Government and which, by uniting legislative and judicial powers to those
of [the] executive, subvert the general principles of free government, as well as the
particular organization and positive provisions of the Federal Constitution; and the
other of which acts exercises, in like manner, a power not delegated by the
Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of the
amendments thereto,-a power, which more than any other, ought to produce
universal alarm, because it is levelled [sic] against that right of freely examining
public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people
thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every
other right.

Id. at 327-29.
285. I have explored this story elsewhere in depth. See generally Lash, Madison'sReport, supra
note 262.
286. See supra Part W.E.
287. See supra Part V.
288. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[W]henever any Form
of Government becomes destructive of [unalienable rights], it is the Right of the People to alter
or to abolish it. . . ."); U.S. Const. art. V (providing for Constitutional amendments).
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Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment significantly reduced that
autonomy when it comes to the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens or
state laws that impact the right to due process or equal protection under the
law. In this way, the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment must be
synthesized with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A comprehensive theory of the Ninth Amendment that takes into
consideration the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment and establishes the
rules for contemporary judicial enforcement is beyond the scope of this
particular Article.289 Nevertheless, because Professor Barnett makes a
number of claims regarding the application of the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments, it is appropriate to at least sketch how the historical evidence
informs the intended relationship between these two critical amendments.
A.

THE NNTHAMENDMENTAND INCORPORATIONDOCTRiNE

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that "no State...
shall abridge the privileges or immunities" of U.S. citizens or deny any
person the right to due process or equal protection under law. 9 This
restriction on state power carves out a portion of rights previously retained
by state majorities and places them beyond the reach of the political process.
The current scholarly debate involves the content of these rights; for
example, whether they include some or all of the first eight amendments or
whether they (also) include certain unenumerated rights such as the right to
privacy or the common law right to pursue a trade.'( No scholar or judge,
however, has ever suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
the Ninth Amendment. From the earliest incorporation cases to modern
doctrine, the Court has consistently limited the scope of incorporation
doctrine to the first eight amendments. 292
The history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
supports the long-standing position of the courts that neither the Ninth nor
the Tenth Amendment is a proper candidate for incorporation. Throughout
the first half of the nineteenth century, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
were viewed as preserving the autonomy of the states. 293 Despite the
289. In a recently published paper, I provide a comprehensive theory of the Ninth
Amendment that reconciles the text of the Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and
presents an enforceable theory of judicial review. See generally Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory,
supra note 1.
290. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
291. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 215-30 (arguing that some but not all of the first eight
amendments were meant to be incorporated); CuRTis, supra note 31, at 219-20 (arguing that
all eight were meant to be incorporated). See generally Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a
Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485 (1999)
(suggesting the possibility of incorporated common law economic rights).
292. See Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence,supra note 1, at 673. In fact, courts originally cited the
Ninth Amendment in support of rejecting a theory of total incorporation. See id. at 675.
293. See generally id.
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incentive to raise every possible liberty claim in opposition to slavery,
abolitionists never referred to the Ninth Amendment in support of their
cause. Instead, in the years leading up to the Civil War, both the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments were invoked on behalf of slavery and the right of states
to secede from the Union. 94 It is no surprise then that the man who drafted
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, left both the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments off of his list of individual privileges or immunities
protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 95 In sum, the
approach of courts and commentators seems well supported by the historical
record: the Fourteenth Amendment was neither intended nor understood
to incorporate the Ninth Amendment.
Although he has no historical evidence for his conclusion, Professor
Barnett believes it is reasonable to assume that the Ninth Amendment and
the Privileges or Immunities Clause "refer to the same set of unenumerable
rights."296 In light of evidence presented in this Article, however, this seems
clearly incorrect.297 As we have seen, the evidence strongly suggests that the
retained rights of the Ninth Amendment included collective majoritarian
rights that, by definition, cannot logically be incorporated against state
majorities (for example, the concurrent power of local majorities to regulate
the state militia). Incorporating these majoritarian rights against the states
would make no more sense than incorporating the Tenth Amendment
against the states. If our reading of the historical record is correct, and at
least some of the rights protected under the Ninth Amendment were
collective in nature, then the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
protect the same set of rights.
Once we understand that the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments do
not protect the same set of rights, this means that the rights of the Ninth
Amendment must be reconciled with the rights of the Fourteenth

294.

See id. at 639.

295. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies the protections of the first eight
amendments against states); see also John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42
EMORY L.J. 967, 1009-22 (1993). Yoo points out that during the nineteenth century state
constitutions adopted provisions echoing the language of the federal Ninth Amendment.
Although I think this is important evidence that the language of the Ninth Amendment could
be viewed in support of individual rights, these state constitutional provisions cannot trump the
extensive express testimony regarding the public understanding of the federal clause itself.
Unlike provisions like the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses that appear to have been
embraced as individual rights provisions by the Civil War, no such transformation appears to
have occurred with the Ninth Amendment. See Lash, The LostJurisprudence,supranote 1, at 64352.
296. BARNE-Ir, supra note 1, at 66.
297. Even Barnett appears to realize the possibility that the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not protect the same set of
rights. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, at 16 (conceding that the Ninth
Amendment might protect both individual and collective rights).
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Amendment. For example, we know that the original Ninth Amendment
prohibited the extension of federal authority into any matter meant to be
left under state majoritarian control. This potentially included everything
from chartering a bank to establishing a religion to providing due process
for deprivation of life, liberty, and property. The Fourteenth Amendment,
however, substantially altered this arrangement and removed broad
categories of rights from the local control of the states. More, under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal government now gained
regulatory power over matters originally denied to it. In this way, the
Fourteenth Amendment significantly altered the original scope of the Ninth
Amendment.
On the other hand, whatever the substantive content of the Fourteenth
Amendment, at some point a limit is reached regarding the plausible
meaning of "privileges or immunities of United States' citizens," "due
process" and "equal protection." The retained rights of the Ninth
Amendment remain in effect to the extent that they have not been
abrogated (or transformed) by the Fourteenth Amendment. Put another
way, where the enumerated rights of the Fourteenth Amendment end, the
remnant rights of the Ninth Amendment begin.
The task then is to determine which of the retained rights the original
Ninth Amendment protected remain under state control and which the
Fourteenth Amendment now protects against state action. For example, the
original Constitution conferred no express power over the subject of
education. Although one could construe the Interstate Commerce Clause
broadly enough to bring all education within national control, this Clause is
a good candidate for that kind of latitudinarian interpretation forbidden by
the Ninth Amendment. Local control of public education thus is likely one
of the rights retained by the collective people in the several states. Unless
the Fourteenth Amendment transformed public education into an
individual right, this means that local control of public education remains
one of the people's retained unenumerated rights guarded by the Ninth
Amendment and unaffected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is precisely because the federalist principle of the Ninth Amendment
remains alive and well even after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment that Professor Barnett's "presumption of liberty" cannot be
correct in regard to the local authority of the states. Although a number of
retained collective rights were erased through the adoption of the
Reconstruction Amendments (state regulation of slavery, among others),
there yet remains an unenumerable set of rights preserved from federal
interference and left under the control of the people in the several states as
a matter of right. Indeed, the Ninth Amendment does create a presumption
of liberty, but it runs in precisely the opposite direction that Barnett
proposes. Any intrusion upon the retained rights of the people must be
justified as a necessary and proper construction of an enumerated federal
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power. This is as true for federal power conferred by the Fourteenth
Amendment as it is for federal power conferred under the original
Constitution. This does not mean that the Ninth Amendment trumps the
Fourteenth Amendment. As noted above, the Fourteenth Amendment
necessarily carves out large portions of the original Ninth Amendment. The
degree of impact the Fourteenth Amendment has on the Ninth, however,
must be based on an interpretation of the enumerated rights and powers of
the Fourteenth Amendment. There are no unenumerated restrictions on the
retained rights of the people.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE INESCAPABLE FEDERALISM OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT

The meaning I ascribe to the Ninth Amendment in this Article is the
same meaning embraced by countless jurists and legal theorists for over onehundred years. At the very least, then, the approach presented here is
anything but idiosyncratic. Perhaps the greatest challenge to this
understanding of the original Ninth Amendment is the modern tendency to
view rights and powers through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment and
presume that states' rights rhetoric generally stands as a crypto-apologia for
segregation and slavery.
But views of local autonomy shift with political realignment. Progressive
voices today are raised on behalf of local control of medicine,29 8 affirmative
action programs, 299 and election law.: ° ° There may yet be room for a vision
of a national people with the sovereign right to divide authority between
national and local governments. There is no doubt, however, that this was
the view of those who debated and ratified the Ninth Amendment. The
Ninth Amendment was then and, to the extent that original meaning
informs current interpretation, remains today inescapably federalist.
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